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REGULATING FARMING: BALANCING FOOD SAFETY
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN A
COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE REGIME
Margot J. Pollans.
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, Congress passed the Food Safety Modernization Act
("Food Safety Act"), authorizing arguably the most significant
expansion of federal regulation of farming methods ever
undertaken.1  The Act directs the Federal Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") to promulgate rules governing any aspect of
the growing, harvesting, packing, or storing of raw produce that
could implicate food safety. 2 To implement this mandate, the FDA
issued the proposed Standards for the Growing, Harvesting,
Packaging, and Holding of Produce for Human Consumption
("Proposed Produce Safety Rule"). 3 The rule employs cooperative
* Academic Fellow, UCLA School of Law, Resnick Program for Food Law
and Policy. For their helpful comments and support, thanks to Barry
Friedman, Jacob Gersen, Richard Revesz, Ann Carlson, Seana Shiffrin,
Christopher Serkin, Samuel Bray, Richard Stewart, Roderick Hills, Michael
Livermore, Edward Parson, Amy Cohen, Alex Wang, Oren Bar-Gill, Rebecca
Stone, Jon Michaels, Sean Hecht, and Michael Roberts. Thanks also to the
participants in the UCLA, Georgetown, and NYU fellows' workshops.
1. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat.
3885 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
2. Id. § 105, 21 U.S.C. § 350h (2012). Food safety in this context refers to
the threat of microbial contamination from pathogens such as listeria,
salmonella, and E. coli. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
("CDC") estimates that in the United States, between 1998 and 2008,
contamination of plant commodities resulted in 24,000 hospitalizations and 363
deaths per year. John A. Painter et al., Attribution of Foodborne Illnesses,
Hospitalizations, and Deaths to Food Commodities by Using Outbreak Data,
United States, 1998-2008, 19 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 407, 409 (2013).
3. The FDA issued the proposed Produce Safety Rule in January 2013.
Standards for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce for
Human Consumption, 78 Fed. Reg. 3504 (proposed Jan. 16, 2013) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. pts. 16, 112) [hereinafter Proposed Produce Safety Rule]. After
several extensions, the comment period closed in November 2013. Standards
for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce for Human
Consumption; Extension of Comment Periods, 78 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (proposed
Aug. 9, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 16, 112). In September 2014, the
FDA issued a Revised Proposed Produce Safety Rule followed by a second
comment period. See Standards for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and
Holding of Produce for Human Consumption, 79 Fed. Reg. 58,434 (proposed
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governance, a mode of regulation that includes farmers in the
regulatory process by requiring them to determine site-specific best
practices. 4 Thus, although the FDA provides a framework for
farmer decision making, it is farmers themselves who determine the
precise details of the regulatory scheme.
The Food Safety Act is the subject of much criticism. Some
scholars question its efficacy, others its necessity. Some focus on its
potential economic consequences for small farmers and alternative
food movements, arguing, among other things, that the statute
imposes significant burdens on smaller producers while ignoring the
inherent risks of an industrialized food supply.5
This Article raises an additional concern: the new food safety
program focuses only on microbial food contamination and ignores
farming's many environmental harms. Agriculture contributes to
water and air pollution, including atmospheric accumulation of
greenhouse gases, thus threatening ecosystems and public health
and imposing serious distributional costs. 6  Further, prevalent
farming practices such as monoculture, the practice of planting a
single crop over a large area, can threaten future crop viability even
as they maximize current productivity. 7 Unlike other industries,
which are subject to extensive mandatory environmental regulation,
the ill effects of agriculture remain largely unrestricted.8 Instead,
farmers may choose to participate in voluntary subsidy programs
and process-based best practice programs. 9 As with food safety
Sept. 29, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 112) [hereinafter Revised
Proposed Produce Safety Rule]. The FDA has not yet issued a final rule.
4. Cooperative governance is an alternative to either performance
standards, which prescribe outcomes, or process standards, which prescribe
particular actions (i.e., that a firm use a particular method or install a
particular technology). Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based
Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 691, 693-94 (2003).
5. See, e.g., Nicholas Obolensky, The Food Safety Modernization Act of
2011: Too Little, Too Broad, Too Bad, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 887, 890
(2012); Diana Stuart & Michelle R. Worosz, Risk, Anti-Reflexivity, and Ethical
Neutralization in Industrial Food Processing, 29 AGRIC. & HuM. VALUES 287,
294 (2012) (describing the risks inherent to centralization of food processing).
6. Jason J. Czarnezki & Elisa K. Prescott, Environmental and Climate
Impacts of Food Production, Processing, Packaging, and Distribution, in FOOD,
AGRICULTURE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 113, 113-29 (Mary Jane Angelo et al.
eds., 2013).
7. Id. at 122 (noting that monocultures require increased application of
nitrogen fertilizers).
8. There are a handful of mandatory regulatory schemes, including
pesticide labeling and concentrated animal feeding operations water pollution
permitting, but these address only narrow aspects of the overall environmental
problem.
9. By process-based standards, I mean standards that prescribe or
proscribe particular practices. For instance, a regulation that directed a farmer
not to install a drip irrigation system would be a process-based standard aimed
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regulation, many of these schemes incorporate cooperative
governance.
At best, the Food Safety Act and its implementing regulations
miss an opportunity to mitigate agriculture's significant
environmental effects. At worst, they deepen those effects. Some
food safety practices may actually harm the environment. Others
will simply draw away from farmers' limited resources that could
otherwise be used to mitigate environmental harms.
This discussion illustrates a classic administrative law problem:
How should regulators manage an industry that generates
conflicting regulatory goals? All regulatory schemes require trade-
offs between competing priorities, and numerous administrative law
tools exist to ensure that those trade-offs reflect reasoned decision
making. Cost-benefit analysis, which can be used to balance the
goals of a regulation with competing interests, is one such tool.
Other solutions focus on mechanisms for interagency collaboration
or executive oversight. 10
This Article focuses on the under-explored question of when and
by whom these trade-off tools are used. Most standard trade-off
management tools-including cost-benefit analysis, environmental
impact analysis, and interagency consultation-address agency
decision making during "rulemaking."
This Article argues that none of those existing tools ensure that
trade-offs in agricultural regulation are adequately reasoned. This
is because agricultural regulation-for both food safety and
environmental protection-employs cooperative governance.
Farmers determine the details of the regulatory scheme after
rulemaking is complete. It may, therefore, be difficult for an agency
to identify and evaluate trade-offs during rulemaking. Instead, it is
farmers themselves, not regulators, who prioritize between food
safety and environmental regulatory goals.
There is therefore a mismatch between existing trade-off
management tools, which focus on agency decisions during
rulemaking, and cooperative agricultural governance, which
delegates authority to farmers to conduct trade-offs during rule
implementation.
With no effective tool for trade-off management, farmers make
decisions with little to no oversight. This allocation of decision
making is problematic given that farmers are likely to have a bias in
favor of food safety. Food retailers often condition market access on
at reducing excess water use and irrigation runoff. Some literature also refers
to this type of regulation as "technology specification." See, e.g., Robert M.
Friedman et al., Environmental Policy Instrument Choice: The Challenge of
Competing Goals, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 327, 334 (2000) (providing a
typology of environmental regulatory tools).
10. See infra Part III (summarizing these tools and the relevant literature).
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compliance with best food safety practices;1 1 for the most part, there
is no parallel incentive for farmers to undertake environmental
improvements. Farmers also face potential strict liability for harms
resulting from the sale of contaminated produce. 12 Liability for
environmental harms is limited. 13 Thus farmers, who have financial
motives to address food safety concerns and few parallel incentives
to address environmental concerns, are poorly situated, without
adequate guidance or oversight, to evaluate trade-offs. Further,
because participation in many environmental programs is
voluntary, these environmental protection directives may lose out in
the face of conflicting and mandatory food safety requirements. 14
Even when there is no direct trade-off, the burden of participation in
multiple cooperative governance schemes may reduce participation
in voluntary programs.
Although one possible solution might be to change the initial
regulatory design-to revoke farmer decision making in favor of
more precise rulemaking-doing so would be technically
challenging. There is no universally accepted answer to the
question of which goal-food safety or environmental protection-is
more important; instead, the answer is context dependent. In other
words, even when it is possible to identify divergence between
regulatory goals early in the process, it may not be feasible to reach
a single resolution that should apply to all regulated entities.
This variation is the main regulatory challenge that cooperative
governance is meant to solve. As a regulatory design, cooperative
governance has gained popularity in recent years because it can
reduce both agency enforcement costs and regulated-entity
compliance costs, while at the same time allowing for individual,
firm-tailored regulation.1 5 The primary disadvantage of cooperative
governance is that it relies on the decision making of private entities
with financial self-interest. 16 Much of the literature on this type of
regulatory design focuses on how to incentivize regulated entities to
11. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (detailing the rise of
retailer food safety mandates); see also FOOD MKTG. INST., PRODUCE SAFETY
BEST PRACTICES GUIDE FOR RETAILERS 3 (2014), available at http://www.fmi.org
/docs/default-source/food-safety/produce-safety-best-practices-guide.pdf?sfvrsn
=2.
12. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text (describing strict
liability standard and potential penalties under federal law for food safety
violations).
13. Very few environmental harms on farms constitute violations of
environmental law. See infra note 35 and accompanying text (describing
exemptions from environmental laws for farmers).
14. For discussion of the voluntary nature of agricultural environmental
regulation, see infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 62 and accompanying text (describing concept of
cooperative governance and identifying its role in food safety regulation).
16. See infra note 173 (describing agency costs as one of cooperative
governance's primary disadvantages).
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faithfully work toward achieving the primary goal of the cooperative
governance scheme. 17 This Article broadens the conversation to
include trade-off management-how to manage regulated entities
where they are working toward multiple goals that may be in
tension.
A new systematic tool is needed to identify and evaluate trade-
offs during rule implementation. This Article identifies one
potential tool that preserves the current allocation of decision
making, but calls for increased transparency in private entity
decision making. The FDA should require that regulated entities
produce publicly available, written assessments of trade-offs
between environmental and food safety goals. The Article further
recommends that the FDA seek assistance in this endeavor from the
United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA"). This approach
treats cooperative governance as a mechanism through which an
agency delegates some of its decision-making authority to regulated
entities. The same accountability and transparency mechanisms
that are designed to improve the quality of agency decisions should
thus apply to regulated entities' decisions as well.
After providing a brief overview of regulation in each area, Part
I of this Article identifies three types of discordance between
produce safety and environmental protection on farms. First,
because of limited resources, farmers will have to choose between
implementing food safety practices and implementing
environmental practices. Second, indirect trade-offs between the
two regulatory goals result in damaging collateral consequences for
the environment. Food safety regulation may exacerbate a range of
existing environmental harms. Third, there is at least one direct
clash that may make compliance with food safety law incompatible
with participation in certain environmental programs. Part I also
addresses the possibility that some environmental protection
practices may also improve food safety.
Part II considers when and by whom these trade-offs are
evaluated during the regulatory process. It argues that existing
trade-off management tools fall short for agricultural regulation
because they fail to take into consideration the structure of
cooperative governance, which delays many of the regulatory
decisions until after rulemaking is over.
Part III offers a typology of trade-off management tools. It
categorizes these solutions based on when in the regulatory process
each of these tools is used. Part III then proposes a solution aimed
at reducing the Food Safety Act's collateral environmental
consequences. It calls on the FDA to require farmers to conduct
written evaluations of trade-offs between food safety and
environmental protection.
17. See infra note 173.
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I. FOOD SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TRADE-OFFS
Farming generates both environmental and food safety risks.
Although regulatory responses to the former are limited, in part due
to the historical power of the agriculture industry, the latter have
received considerable attention in recent years. Ramped-up food
safety programs, aimed at farm-related produce contamination, may
exacerbate agriculture's already severe environmental harms and
make participation in environmental programs more difficult.
A. Food Safety and Environmental Regulation: The Lay of the
Land
1. Environmental Regulation
Modern agriculture imposes significant adverse environmental
effects, but few of these effects are regulated.18 And much of the
regulation that does exist is voluntary.
Two types of harm merit particular discussion: harms to off-
farm environments and harms to farming resources, such as soil and
water. First, farming practices generate numerous environmental
externalities that threaten public health via air and water
pollution.19 Agriculture remains one of the leading, if not the most
significant, sources of water pollution.20 Also, farm air emissions,
which are mostly exempt from Clean Air Act 21  permitting
18. For a thorough treatment of the environmental harms, see generally,
J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law: Part
1, 27 ECOLOGY L. Q. 263 (2000). Beyond environmental costs, agriculture
industry practices can also generate significant social costs related to worker
treatment and rural poverty.
19. Id. at 287-92.
20. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 841-F-05-001, PROTECTING WATER
QUALITY FROM AGRICULTURAL RUNOFF (2005), available at http://water.epa.gov
/polwaste/nps/upload/AgRunoff FactSheet.pdf ("In the 2000 National Water
Quality Inventory, states reported that agricultural nonpoint source (NPS)
pollution is the leading source of water quality impacts on surveyed rivers and
lakes, the second largest source of impairments to wetlands, and a major
contributor to contamination of surveyed estuaries and ground water."); see also
Robert W. Adler, Agriculture and Water Quality: A Climate-Integrated
Perspective, 37 VT. L. REV. 847, 850-57 (2013) (describing the scope of the
problem and evidence of EPA and congressional awareness of the problem).
Since the 1970 passage of the Clean Water Act, the waters of the United States
have become vastly cleaner, but agricultural runoff is not subject to some of the
Act's central mechanisms. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012) ("The term 'point
source'. . . does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and return
flows from irrigated agriculture."). Irrigation return flow, sometimes called
agricultural return flow, is the surface and subsurface water that leaves the
field following application of irrigation. Return Flow Definition, NAT'L AGRIC. L.
CENTER, http://nationalaglawcenter.org/ag-law-glossary/glossary-r/ (last visited
Apr. 22, 2014).
21. See generally Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2012).
[Vol. 50
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requirements, impair air quality and contribute to atmospheric
greenhouse gases.22
The scope of risk from air and water pollution varies depending
on the type of farm. At the most harmful end of the spectrum are
concentrated animal feeding operations ("CAFO"), where large
numbers of animals are housed and fed in close confinement. 23
CAFO pollutants affect health outcomes for employees and
neighbors. 24  The most serious air pollutants include hydrogen
22. For a thorough treatment of Clean Air Act requirements in the
agricultural context, see generally Teresa B. Clemmer, Agriculture and the
Clean Air Act, in FOOD, AGRICULTURE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 6,
at 163, 163. On the role of agriculture in climate change, see U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, EPA 430-R- 11-005, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND
SINKS: 1990-2009, at 6-1 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange
/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-20 11-CompleteReport.pdf. In
2009, agriculture generated about 6.3 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions in
the United States. Id. at tbl.6-1.
23. The EPA defines an animal feeding operation ("AFO") as:
a lot or facility ... where ... [a]nimals ... have been, are, or will be
stabled or confined and fed or maintained for a total of 45 days or
more in any 12-month period, and [crops, vegetation, forage growth,
or post-harvest residues are not sustained in the normal growing
season over any portion of the lot or facility.
40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1) (2013). A CAFO is a large or medium AFO or a small
AFO that either a state or the EPA has determined is a "significant contributor
of pollutants to waters of the United States." Id. § 122.23(b)(2), (c). Large and
medium AFOs are defined by the number of confined animals and, particularly
for high numbers of fowl (excluding turkeys), the structure of the pollutant
discharge system. Id. § 122.23(b)(4), (6). CAFO manure is a particularly potent
source of environmental harm. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-
944, CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS: EPA NEEDS MORE
INFORMATION AND A CLEARLY DEFINED STRATEGY TO PROTECT AIR AND WATER
QUALITY FROM POLLUTANTS OF CONCERN 18 (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/280229.pdf (explaining that a large CAFO may
produce as much waste as a large city); Terence J. Centner, Establishing a
Rational Basis for Regulating Animal Feeding Operations: A View of the
Evidence, 27 VT. L. REV. 115, 115 (2002) (estimating that animal feedlots
contribute pollutants to about sixteen percent of the total impaired waterways
in the United States). In traditional animal husbandry, manure is widely
dispersed across a large grazing area, and it is reincorporated into the
landscape as a natural fertilizer. In CAFOs, it is concentrated in a small area
and held in large containment ponds. Jiayang Cheng, Challenges of CAFO
Waste Management, 129 J. ENVTL. ENGINEERING 391, 391 (2003) (describing the
manure management practices used in most CAFOs).
24. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 23, at 24-25 (listing
studies identifying health impacts); Centner, supra note 23, at 116-17. These
impacts raise serious environmental justice concerns because CAFOs are
commonly located in "low-income rural areas with disproportionate numbers of
people of color who have experienced discrimination and already have poor
health conditions for other reasons, including poverty." LESLIE PRAY ET AL.,
INST. OF MED. & NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EXPLORING HEALTH AND
ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF FOOD: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 40 (2012), available at
http://safsf.org/documents/repository/114-09-13-13-13521.pdf; see also Kelley J.
Donham et al., Community Health and Socioeconomic Issues Surrounding
20151
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sulfide and ammonia, both of which often exceed Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") standards in surrounding areas. 25
CAFOs also inflict quality of life and mental health costs on farm
workers and neighbors, primarily due to CAFOs' putrid smell, which
renders surrounding areas nearly uninhabitable. 26
CAFOs are not the only farms with such externalities: many
fruit, vegetable, grain, and fiber operations rely on a variety of poor
management practices that contribute to air and water pollution.2 7
For instance, pesticide and fertilizer application poses significant
localized risks for farm workers and neighbors. 28 Further, it poses
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 317, 318
(2007); Sacoby M. Wilson et al., Environmental Injustice and the Mississippi
Hog Industry, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 195, 195 (2002); Steve Wing et al.,
Environmental Injustice in North Carolina's Hog Industry, 108 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERsP. 225, 230 (2000) (showing high correlation between hog farm locations
and neighborhoods that were both poor and black). Further, farmworkers, who
bear the brunt of these health costs, have extremely low wages and few political
protections. See Guadalupe T. Luna, Agriculture, Rural Workers and Free
Trade, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 789, 790 (1994) (explaining that low wages are
common and children often accompany parents into the fields to supplement
income); Guadalupe T. Luna, An Infinite Distance?: Agricultural Exceptionalism
and Agricultural Labor, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 487, 487 (1998) (describing
the lack of protections for migrant and seasonal farmworkers).
25. See Donham et al., supra note 24 (noting that on hog farms "at least
25% of confinement workers suffer from respiratory diseases including
bronchitis, mucus membrane irritation, asthmalike syndrome, and acute
respiratory distress syndrome"). Other air pollutants include "odor" and
"endotoxin." Leah Schinasi et al., Air Pollution, Lung Function, and Physical
Symptoms in Communities Near Concentrated Swine Feeding Operations, 22
EPIDEMIOLOGY 208, 208 (2011). Neighbors also experience these symptoms.
Donham et al., supra note 24. In a study of North Carolina residents living
within 1.5 miles of a concentrated hog operation, researchers found elevated
levels of acute eye irritation, throat irritation, nausea, and respiratory
symptoms. Schinasi et al., supra, at 209, 211-12 (linking timing of symptoms
to physical measures of ambient air quality); see also DOUG GURIAN-SHERMAN,
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, CAFOs UNCOVERED: THE UNTOLD COSTS OF
CONFINED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 54 (2008), available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/food-and-agri
culture/cafos-uncovered.pdf.
26. PRAY ET AL., supra note 24, at 41. Neighbors experience increased levels
of depression, anxiety, and sleep disturbances. Donham et al., supra note 24.
27. See, e.g., Agricultural Pesticides, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/agl01/printcrop.html#pestuse (last visited Feb.
19, 2015) (noting the environmental externalities of pesticide use).
28. Agricultural workers face elevated risks of certain types of cancers
including lymphatic, hematopoietic, prostate, stomach, and cervical, and they
face higher mortality rates for certain cancers, which likely follows from later-
stage diagnosis. Paul K. Mills et al., Cancer in Migrant and Seasonal Hired
Farm Workers, 14 J. AGROMEDICINE 185, 189-90 (2009) (reviewing existing
epidemiological studies and reporting on results of a new study of farmworkers
in California).
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broader geographical risks for drinking water and aquatic
habitats. 29
Second, many current agricultural practices impose long-term
costs, straining natural resources that are essential to food
production.3 0  The environmental harms described above are
externalities-they implicate what environmental scientists call
output sustainability, affecting the environment beyond the farm.
But farming also has significant environmental harms that
implicate input sustainability, affecting agricultural resources such
29. See, e.g., Mary H. Ward et al., Workgroup Report: Drinking-Water
Nitrate and Health-Recent Findings and Research Needs, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSP. 1607, 1607 (2005) (noting that about twenty-two percent of domestic
wells in agricultural regions of the United States exceed nitrate maximum
contaminant levels). Fertilizer runoff, from both plant and animal farms,
contributes to excessive nutrient loading in many important fisheries, including
the Gulf of Mexico and the Chesapeake Bay. See, e.g., Jon Cannon, Choices and
Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
379, 395-96 & n.78 (2000) (describing the problem of agricultural runoff in the
Chesapeake Bay); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones,
and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away,
98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 60 & n.4 (2010) (describing the problem of nutrient flows
into the Gulf of Mexico). Nutrient loading causes surface-level algae blooms
that cut off sunlight and oxygen, suffocating fish and resulting in large-scale
aquatic dead zones. See Margot J. Pollans, Note, Bundling Public and Private
Goods: The Market for Sustainable Organics, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621, 626 (2010)
(describing agricultural runoffs negative effect on aquatic biodiversity).
30. Many experts have expressed concern that these threats to production
may create future food shortages. Currently, there is enough food to feed the
entire global population. According to recent estimates, worldwide grain
production, if divided evenly, could feed every living person 3500 calories per
day. GEORGE McGOVERN, THE THIRD FREEDOM: ENDING HUNGER IN OUR TIME 11
(2001) (noting that this figure does not include global production of vegetables,
fruit, meat, poultry, oils, nuts, roots, and dairy). But the consensus today
among scholars is that to feed ourselves in the future we need to address some
of agriculture's primary environmental impacts today. Special Rapporteur on
the Right to Food, Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Food, Olivier De Schutter, 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/49 (Dec. 20, 2010) available
at http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/officialreports/201 10308 a-hrc-16-
49_agroecology-en.pdf ("[I]ncreasing food production to meet future needs,
while necessary, is not sufficient .... [S]hort-term gains will be offset by long-
term losses if it leads to further degradation of ecosystems, threatening future
ability to maintain current levels of production."); David P. Lambert, The Quest
to End Hunger in Our Time: Can Political Will Catch Up with Our Core
Values?, 6 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 167, 184 (2010) (identifying environmental
sustainability as the most central concept in the current debate on food
security). Population growth further motivates these concerns. Michael R.
Taylor, The Emerging Merger of Agricultural and Environmental Policy:
Building a New Vision for the Future of American Agriculture, 20 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 169, 184-85 (2001). Some observers estimate that food production must
increase by as much as seventy percent by 2050 to account for increased
demand. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, supra, 7 (citing studies
and describing some of the assumptions behind this number).
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as soil, water, and biodiversity. 31 Input harms threaten agriculture
itself, creating risks of systemic or regional collapse in the face of
soil erosion, water scarcity, and reduced resilience to pests and
disease. 32
In the long term, farmers have a financial interest in taking
steps to preserve productivity. But, in the short term, steps to do
so-for instance, crop rotation, preserving borderlands, reducing
tillage, and reducing pesticide application-increase production
costs (and these costs cannot easily be passed to consumers).
31. John H. Davidson, Sustainable Development and Agriculture in the
United States, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,543, 10,543 (2002) (defining "internal" and
"external" sustainability); see also SUSANNA DAVIES ET AL., INST. OF DEV.
STUDIES, FOOD SECURITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICT OR
COMPLEMENTARITY? 1 (1991) ("By environmental sustainability, we mean uses
of natural resources which meet the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.").
32. See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 31, at 2 (noting
"complementarities... between access to food and a healthy natural resource
base"); see also William S. Eubanks II, A Rotten System: Subsidizing
Environmental Degradation and Poor Public Health with Our Nation's Tax
Dollars, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 213, 251-73 (2009) (overviewing the myriad of
environmental costs of large-scale modern agriculture). Climate change, which
is expected to increase water scarcity and accelerate the spread of pests and
disease, puts further stress on farm systems. LESTER R. BROwN, FULL PLANET,
EMPTY PLATES: THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF FOOD SCARCITY 83-85 (2012); Larry W.
Harrington & Peter R. Hobbs, Challenge and Threats to Sustainable Food
Production, in ADEQUATE FOOD FOR ALL: CULTURE, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY OF
FOOD IN THE 21ST CENTURY 235, 240 (Wilson G. Pond et al., eds. 2009) (listing
climate change among current threats to production sustainability); Graham
Frederick Dumas, Note, A Greener Revolution: Using the Right to Food as a
Political Weapon Against Climate Change, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 107,
112-13 (2010). Scientists predict that climate change's strongest impacts on
agriculture will be in countries closest to the equator. There, rising
temperatures will shorten the growing season and facilitate the spread of
disease. DAVIES, ET AL., supra note 31, at 11-12; Harrington & Hobbs, supra.
Climate change could actually make domestic agriculture more productive.
DAVIES, ET AL., supra note 31, at 11-12; Dumas, supra, at 113-14. But the
United States depends on the global food system for a substantial and growing
percentage of food. NORA BROOKS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., U.S. FOOD IMPORT
PATTERNS, 1998-2007 at 6 (2009), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/157859
/fau125_l_.pdf (finding that between 1998 and 2007 fruit and nut imports more
than doubled, with total imports reaching $14 billion in 2007). In 2009, total
food imports accounted for about seventeen percent of total U.S. food
consumption, of which 8.1 billion in imports come from fruits and nuts; 5.8
billion from vegetables; 15.9 billion from beverages; 5.2 billion from coffee, tea,
and spices; and 3.7 billion from cocoa. GEORGE S. SERLETIS, U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, U.S. AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS REACHED A RECORD $86 BILLION IN 2010
MAKING THE UNITED STATES THE WORLD'S LEADING SINGLE-COUNTRY IMPORTER
OF FOOD PRODUCTS (2011), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332
/AGImport.pdf; see also RENtE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34468,
THE U.S. TRADE SITUATION FOR FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PRODUCTS (2014),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34468.pdf.
408 [Vol. 50
REGULATING FARMING
Farmers therefore have a short-term incentive to ignore these costs,
and they may do so either because they underestimate the severity
of the long-term costs, or because they assume that technological
innovation will obviate the need to take any current action. 33
Notwithstanding agriculture's widespread environmental costs,
farming remains largely unregulated. No environmental regulatory
scheme comprehensively addresses the harms described above. 34
Among other substantial regulatory gaps, the industry enjoys
exemptions from the major federal environmental statutes,
including significant parts of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water
Act. 38
Other programs specifically aimed at reducing the
environmental effects of farming are very narrow in scope. For
instance, the Clean Water Act regulates water pollution from a
subset of CAFOs, but leaves water pollution from many other
CAFOs, and most other farms, virtually unregulated.3 6 The EPA
and many states encourage, but do not require, farmers to employ
best management practices for reducing runoff, and provide
33. For some farmers, this myopia may follow simply from the fact that
many farmers are older (the average age of a farmer is fifty-seven) and likely
not expecting to pass their land along to the next generation; instead, they
probably expect to sell (or expect their children to sell) to a housing developer,
so there is no need to take long-term productivity into account. Demographics,
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/aglOl
/demographics.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2015). For others, the myopia likely
stems from inadequate education about need and methods for conservation.
34. See, e.g., SusAN A. SCHNEIDER, FOOD, FARMING, AND SUSTAINABILITY:
READINGS IN AGRICULTURAL LAw (2011) (describing some of the critical legal
issues facing the farm industry and consumers); Ruhl, supra note 18, at 265.
35. Ruhl, supra note 18, at 293-309 (cataloging the coverage and
exemptions for agriculture under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act);
Susan A. Schneider, A Reconsideration of Agricultural Law: A Call for the Law
of Food, Farming, and Sustainability, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
935, 935-36 (2010). The agriculture industry also enjoys carve-outs from the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Cleanup, and Liability Act (a.k.a. "Superfund"), the
two toxic waste management and cleanup statutes. Ruhl, supra note 18, at
313-15.
36. The Clean Water Act requires the EPA to regulate CAFOs as point
sources subject to effluent limits. See Ruhl, supra note 18, at 316-18
(describing the history of CAFO regulation and noting that as of 1998 only
2,000 of about 450,000 AFOs had Clean Water Act permits). There is, however,
potential to use the Clean Water Act's nonpoint source pollution provisions to
impose more mandatory requirements. See, e.g., Douglas R. Williams, When
Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail: Structuring a Regulatory Response to
Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 21, 81-
82 (2002) (noting the possibility of more expansive regulation under the Clean
Water Act's "total maximum daily load" provisions which allow for regulation of
nonpoint sources in addition to point sources).
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technical assistance to farmers who choose to do so. 37 In addition,
the USDA's Conservation Stewardship Program pays farmers to
adopt conservation practices on working agricultural lands. 38 These
payments allow farmers to address environmental harms, such as
soil erosion and habitat loss, whose costs are not typically reflected
in food prices. 39 Only five percent of total farm acreage is enrolled in
the program. 40
Finally, there is the organic labeling program, a market-based
approach to environmental regulation. The Organic Foods
Production Act of 1990 creates an opt-in labeling scheme and, within
certain broad constraints, delegates responsibility to farmers to
create their own organic management plans. 41 The scheme creates a
financial incentive for conventional growers to adopt organic
practices in order to earn a share of the organic price premium. 42
37. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL MANAGEMENT MEASURES
TO CONTROL NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION FROM AGRICULTURE (2003), available
at http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/agriculture/agmm-index.cfm (providing
guidance to states, localities, and tribes on implementing nonpoint source
pollution management programs).
38. See Conservation Stewardship Program-Payment for Performance,
USDA NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps
/portal/nrcs/detailfull/national/programs/financial/csp/?cid=nrcsl43_008316
(last visited Feb. 26, 2015). For a description of all of the USDA's various green
payment programs, see MEGAN STUBBS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40763,
AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION: A GUIDE TO PROGRAMS (2013), available at
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40763.pdf. In addition to creating green payment
programs, the Agricultural Act of 2014 also requires the USDA to deny various
commodity payments and crop insurance to farmers who fail to comply with
certain basic conservation compliance requirements related to soil erosion and
wetlands protection. 16 U.S.C. § 3811(a) (2012), amended by Agricultural Act of
2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 762 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7 U.S.C.).
39. On this type of market-based regulatory strategy, see generally Charles
F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 54-55 (2011) (discussing the minimalist
strategy of administrative law, which is driven by market choices).
40. As of 2012, just shy of fifty million acres were enrolled. NAT'L
SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COAL., CONSERVATION STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM-RANKED BY
ACRES AS % OF TOTAL AG LAND (2012), available at http://sustainableagriculture
.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/CSP-Acres-2010-2012-Percentage-of-total-
farm-acres.pdf (compiling program participation data from the USDA's Natural
Resources Conservation Service with agricultural land data from the USDA's
National Agricultural Statistics Service).
41. See Tacy Katherine Hass, New Governance: Can User-Promulgated
Certification Schemes Provide Safer, Higher Quality Food?, 68 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 77, 87 (2013) (identifying organic labeling as a successful example of new
governance); see also Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. § 6506(2)
(2012) (requiring that "producers and handlers desiring to participate under
[the] program establish an organic plan").
42. JULIE GUTHMAN, AGRARIAN DREAMS: THE PARADOX OF ORGANIC FARMING
IN CALIFORNIA 33 (2d ed. 2014) ("The organic designation was ... one way to
generate value.").
[Vol. 50
REGULATING FARMING
Commentators debate the extent to which organic labeling actually
generates environmental benefits. 43
The narrow scope and the voluntary nature of these programs
reflect political and practical hurdles to agricultural regulation.
Historically, the agriculture industry has maintained substantial
political influence. 44 This power is reflected in its ability to avoid
onerous regulatory burdens. 45 The industry also enjoys substantial
regulatory benefits-cheap land, research and technical support,
and commodity subsidies. 46  The heterogeneity of agricultural
practices, the uncertainty of agricultural science, and the difficulty
of measuring agricultural pollution further complicate the
regulatory endeavor. 47
43. See, e.g., Pollans, supra note 29, at 640 (considering why the organics
program is unsuccessful as an environmental regulation).
44. Scholars have attributed this influence in part to the structure of
Congress, which gives enormous power to less populated-i.e. rural-states,
and to the lingering power of Thomas Jefferson's vision of the farmer as the
lifeblood of American community and democracy. Jim Chen, Of Agriculture's
First Disobedience and Its Fruit, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1261, 1275-76 (1995) ("The
original Constitution so blessed agriculture that farm interests enjoyed nearly
two centuries of political dominion through disproportionately favorable
representation."); Richard S. Kirkendall, Up to Now: A History of American
Agriculture from Jefferson to Revolution to Crisis, 4 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 4, 5
(1987) ("In [Jefferson's] view .... farm[s] conferred independence, since the
people on it worked for themselves, not others, and it required self-reliance and
hard work. Its most important product was the personality type required for a
democracy .... ).
45. In addition to significant carve-outs in environmental law, the
agricultural industry also enjoys the benefits of carve-outs from some labor
laws, antitrust laws, and bankruptcy laws. See Schneider, supra note 35 (citing
7 U.S.C. § 291 (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012)).
46. For a historical review of federal policies supporting U.S. agriculture,
see ANNE B. W. EFFLAND, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., U.S. FARM POLICY: THE FIRST 200
YEARS 21 (2000), available at http://www.farmlandinfo.org/sites/default/files/US
FarmPolicyMarch 2000_l.pdf (describing four periods of federal support:
1785-1890, support via land distribution and settlement; 1830-1914, support
via research and education; 1870-1933, support via infrastructure development
and free markets; and, 1924-present, support via income stabilization).
47. It was this combination of problems that led the EPA, in the 1970s, to
refuse to regulate irrigation return flows under the Clean Water Act. The
original language of the Clean Water Act included irrigation return flows as a
point source requiring a Clean Water Act discharge permit. See supra note 20
(defining irrigation return flow). Expressing concern that given the vast
number of farms and variety of farming practices it would be infeasible to
permit return flows, the EPA promulgated a rule excluding those flows from the
definition of point source. Ruhl, supra note 18, at 294 (citing 38 Fed. Reg.
18,000, 18,003 (1973)). The D.C. Circuit struck down the rule, and Congress,
agreeing with the EPA, amended the statute to embrace the EPA's
interpretation. Id. (citing NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); see
also infra Subpart II.B.2 (considering the regulatory challenges posed by this
heterogeneity).
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2. Food Safety Regulation
Harmful pathogens, including listeria, salmonella, and E. coli
sicken thousands of people every year.48 Between 1998 and 2008,
forty-six percent of all foodborne illness outbreaks were attributable
to produce. 49  There are numerous pathways for produce
contamination, many of which are linked to human and domestic-
animal manure.50  Farming practices, including application of
biological soil amendments (manure and compost), selection of
irrigation water sources, and employee hygiene practices, contribute
to food safety risks.51
In contrast to environmental regulation, food safety regulation
is becoming far more comprehensive. The USDA holds regulatory
authority over meat, poultry, and dairy safety. 52 It maintains
continuous inspection of slaughter and processing facilities. 53 The
FDA regulates most of the rest of the food supply and is charged
with ensuring that food is safe, nutritious, and accurately labeled.54
Among other activities, the FDA sets safety standards for various
foods, including the acceptable levels of contaminants and the safety
of food additives. 55 It also coordinates with various state health
agencies, which are primarily responsible for the actual inspection of
food processing facilities. 56
The 2010 Food Safety Act preserves this basic division of labor
between the USDA and the FDA but dramatically expands the
FDA's authority, bringing farms under its direct control for the first
48. See Painter et al., supra note 2, at 409-10.
49. Id. at 407; see also id. at 412-13 (estimating about 23,000 annual
hospitalizations from plant-based outbreaks and about 363 annual deaths).
Meat safety is also a significant problem. Beef and poultry cause 55 and 278
deaths per year respectively. Id. at 413.
50. See, e.g., Douglas A. Powell et al., Produce in Public: Spinach, Safety,
and Public Policy, in MICROBIAL SAFETY OF FRESH PRODUCE 369, 370-71
(Xuetong Fan et al. eds., 2009) (listing both pre- and postharvest potential
pathways for contamination).
51. Id.
52. REN9E JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22600, THE FEDERAL FOOD
SAFETY SYSTEM: A PRIMER 2-4 (2014), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs
/misc/RS22600.pdf.
53. Id. at 5. Within the USDA, the Food Safety Inspection Service has
primary responsibility for food safety. Id.
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id. Numerous other agencies, including the EPA, the CDC, and the
Department of Homeland Security, also play a role in food safety regulation.
See id. at 14-15 (listing all relevant agencies and their regulatory
responsibilities); see also Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing
Federal Food Safety Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61, 65 (2000)
(describing the fragmentation within food safety regulation, exploring problems
arising from this fragmentation, including redundancies and regulatory gaps,
and calling for reorganization); infra Subpart III.B.3 (considering potential
advantages of regulatory fragmentation).
412 [Vol. 50
REGULATING FARMING
time.57 Prior to the Food Safety Act, the FDA had authority over
farms to conduct investigations of unsanitary conditions or to
investigate food safety outbreaks, but this authority was rarely used
and was mainly reactive to suspected hazards. 58 One of the Act's
primary goals was to shift from a responsive to a proactive
approach. 59 The bipartisan legislation received substantial industry
support.60
The Food Safety Act builds on two earlier developments in food
safety regulation. First, in the 1990s, the USDA, which regulates
meat safety, layered on to its existing animal slaughter inspection
process a "hazard analysis and critical control points" ("HACCP")
system. This system requires regulated entities to develop firm-
specific plans that identify sources of food safety risk and methods
for control.61 This "management-style regulation" shifts the burden
for developing specific action plans from regulators to firm
managers, maintaining centralized authority for standard
development, but allowing plans to be specifically tailored to
individual operations. 62 It also reflects a shift in focus from the end
57. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes:
Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy
Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1280 (2012) ("Federal food regulation has
focused traditionally on post-farm industrial processing. But for raw fruits and
vegetables, most of the 'critical control points' are on the farm.").
58. NAT'L SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COAL., FOOD SAFETY ON THE FARM: POLICY
BRIEF AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2009), available at
http://sustainableagriculture.net/wp.content/uploads/2008/08/NSACFood.
Safety-Policy-Brief-October-2009.pdf (describing the status of FDA authority
prior to the enactment of the Food Safety Act and explaining that the "FDA
ha[d] broad, general authority to regulate at least some on-farm activities, but
it rarely [did] so"); see also RENtE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34612,
FOOD SAFETY ON THE FARM 5 (2011), available at http://nationalaglawcenter.org
/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL34612.pdf.
59. H.R. REP. No. 111-234, at 35 (2009) (noting the statute's goal of
"preventing food safety problems" (emphasis added)).
60. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text (elaborating on industry
motives for support of federal action).
61. The traditional meat safety scheme, in place since the early twentieth
century, requires end-of-the-line organoleptic (sight, smell, touch) inspection of
all animals and carcasses. Originally developed for NASA, HACCP is also used
in the juice industry. JOHNSON, supra note 52, at 16. Although the bulk of the
food safety regime is under the jurisdiction of the FDA, meat, poultry, and eggs
are under the jurisdiction of the USDA's Food Safety Inspection Service. Id. at
14-17 (showing breakdown of food safety authority among various federal
agencies). HACCP reflects a significant shift because it relies on delegation of
autonomy to meat processors to allow for flexibility, learning, and adaptation.
Sabel & Simon, supra note 39, at 55.
62. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 4, at 694 ("Under management-based
regulatory strategies, firms are expected to produce plans that comply with
general criteria designed to promote the targeted social goal."); Richard B.
Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV.
21, 127-28 (2001) (suggesting that this regulatory strategy may be appropriate
where "the conduct of organizations may be too far too ranging and
2015] 413
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
product to the production process. In its Proposed Produce Safety
Rule, the FDA adopts a version of the HACCP program for some on-
farm food processing and recommends that farms engage in hazard
analysis for their agricultural operations. 63
Second, also in the 1990s, following a directive from the Clinton
Administration's Initiative to Ensure the Safety of Imported and
Domestic Fruits and Vegetables, the FDA developed a series of
commodity-specific Good Agricultural Practices ("GAP").64 Again,
this development reflects a shift from product to process. Although
these were nonbinding guidance documents, private retailers began
requiring compliance with these or with privately developed
standards as a condition of wholesale produce purchase. 65 Growers
dynamic ... to be successfully contained by external controls" and that the
strategy may be useful to overcome "inherent limits on government
information"). Within such systems, regulators are responsible for developing
criteria for management planning, and, often for approving specific plans, and
for auditing firms for compliance. Sabel & Simon, supra note 57, at 1278-79
(observing that the shift in the food safety context reflects the fact that
microbial hazards are not "well understood, uniform, or stable"); Stewart,
supra, at 128. Because of this burden shifting, these regimes may also help
relieve agency resource shortages, a particular problem for the FDA. See, e.g.,
SUBCOMM. ON SCI. & TECH., FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK 21 (2007),
available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/O7fbriefing/2007-4329b_02 01
_FDA%20Report%20on%2OScience%20and%2OTechnology.pdf (finding that
funding shortages threatened a variety of important FDA functions across the
full scope of its responsibilities); see also Stewart, supra, at 127 (observing that
this regulatory approach may be useful to overcome "inherent limits
on ... administrative and enforcement resources").
63. Proposed Produce Safety Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 3504, 3530-32 (proposed
Jan. 16, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 16, 112) (concluding that HACCP
would be burdensome for farms and tentatively deciding not to require it, but
recommending that farmers do it anyway while the FDA is seeking comments
on whether it should be required). The FDA proposed a separate rule governing
food processing facilities that does require a HACCP-like analysis. Farms that
engage in certain kinds of on farm food processing qualify as facilities subject to
those requirements. Id. at 3520-22 (suggesting that such facilities may be
subject to § 418 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
64. Kenneth S. Petersen, Third-Party Audit Programs for the Fresh-
Produce Industry, in MICROBIAL SAFETY OF FRESH PRODUCE, supra note 50, at
321, 321. The FDA's Guidance for Industry: Guide to Minimize Microbial Food
Safety Hazards of Fresh-Cut Fruits and Vegetables also included good
manufacturing practices governing postfarm food processing. Id.; see U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GUIDE TO MINIMIZE MICROBIAL FOOD
SAFETY HAZARDS FOR FRESH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES 5 (1998), available at
http://www.fda.govldownloads/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformatio
n/GuidanceDocuments/ProduceandPlanProducts/UCM 169112.pdf. The good
manufacturing practices were based in part on a 1998 fresh produce safety
guidance document published by the International Fresh Produce Association
known as GAP. Rita Marie Cain, Salads, Safety and Speech Under a National
Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 311, 317 (2012).
65. Petersen, supra note 64. In 1999, Safeway became the first retailer to
impose this requirement; at first it imposed the requirement only for leafy
greens, but ultimately extended it to all produce. Id. at 322. Albertson's
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thus had a strong financial incentive to adopt GAP because doing so
would improve their market access. 66
In 2006, following a significant E. coli outbreak, which was
ultimately traced to a few fields of spinach in California and which
led to a nationwide spinach recall, California marketers
implemented the California Leafy Green Marketing Agreement.6 7
The Agreement, which tracks the FDA's leafy green GAP, required
that participating marketers commit to purchase only from growers
who complied with best practices laid out in the Agreement.68
Although participation was voluntary, nearly one hundred percent
of California marketers signed on within the first year. 69 The USDA
took steps toward developing a nationwide marketing agreement
modeled on the California Agreement, but it terminated proceedings
following the Food Safety Act's enactment. 70
followed suit shortly thereafter. Id. In 2006, the USDA began requiring good
agricultural and good handling practices-verified by a third-party audit-for
sources of school lunch produce. Id.
66. See Linda Calvin et al., The Economics of Food Safety: The 2006
Foodborne Illness Outbreak Linked to Spinach, in MICROBIAL SAFETY OF FRESH
PRODUCE, supra note 50, at 399, 409 (observing that long term liability risks
incentivized improved food safety practices but that the "more immediate
benefit of adopting better food safety practices is that it satisfies many retailers
and food service buyers who require third-party audits of grower food safety
practices as a precondition of purchase"); RODERICK M. REJESUS, N.C. Coop.
EXTENSION, GOOD AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES GAP CERTIFICATION: IS IT WORTH IT?
(2009), available at http://www4.ncsu.edu/-rmrejesu/Food-Safety-Risk/ag-709
%20final%20printed.pdf (noting that GAP certification provides access to major
supermarket chains, school systems, and restaurants, and finding that Mexican
green onion growers with GAP certification were less harmed by demand
collapse following the outbreak associated with Mexican green onions).
67. A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson, Integrating Stakeholder Roles
in Food Production, Marketing, and Safety Systems: An Evolving Multi-
Jurisdictional Approach, 26 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 29, 51, 66 (2011). Arizona
developed a similar agreement shortly thereafter. About Us, ARIZ. LEAFY
GREENS FOOD SAFETY COMMITTEE, http://www.arizonaleafygreens.org/about-us/
(last visited Feb. 17, 2015). The California and Arizona agreements together
covered nearly ninety percent of all leafy greens grown in the United States.
Endres & Johnson, supra, at 66-67. Marketing agreements, originally
authorized by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, and then reauthorized
after that Act's invalidation in the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of
1937, are typically used to control and standardize commodity prices. Id. at 67-
71. Most marketing agreements are entered into at the request of the USDA to
implement marketing orders. Id. at 80. Using a marketing agreement to effect
food safety policy is therefore quite unusual.
68. Endres & Johnson, supra note 67, at 66.
69. Id.
70. National Marketing Agreement Regulating Leafy Green Vegetables;
Termination of Proceeding on Proposed Marketing Agreement, 78 Fed. Reg.
73,111 (proposed Dec. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 970) [hereinafter
Leafy Green Vegetable Proposal].
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The Food Safety Act incorporates the GAP model, giving the
FDA broad authority over farming practices.7 1 The statute directs
the FDA to "establish science-based minimum standards for the safe
production and harvesting of those types of fruits and
vegetables ... that are raw agricultural commodities." 72 The statute
also requires the FDA to ensure that the final rules are consistent
with the environmental directives of other agencies and with the
USDA's organic certification standards. 73 Further, it requires that
the FDA allow farmers flexibility; thus, the proposed regulations
frequently allow farmers leeway to adopt compliance alternatives.74
The resulting Proposed Produce Safety Rule combines
traditional process-based regulations with cooperative governance.
Included in the specific process directives are a prohibition on the
sale of produce that dropped to the ground prior to harvest 75 and a
prohibition on the use of human waste as fertilizer.7 6 Cooperative
mechanisms include options to select alternatives for water
treatment methods77 and an obligation to monitor the farm for
animal intrusion "[a]s needed" based on "[the farmer's] observations
and experience." 78
The leafy greens industry supported passage of the Food Safety
Act, pushing first for a national version of the California Leafy
Green Marketing Agreement 79 and then for the Food Safety Act and
71. Proposed Produce Safety Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 3504, 3530 (proposed Jan.
16, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 16, 112) (noting that in crafting new
rules the FDA drew on its previous experience with food guidance). Although
these are proposed, and not final, it is unclear that the overarching structure of
this approach will change in the final rules.
72. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act § 105(a)(1)(A), 21 U.S.C.
§ 350h(a)(1)(A) (2012). The statute specifically directs the FDA to include
standards related to "soil amendments, hygiene, packaging, temperature
controls, animals in the growing area, and water." Id. § 105(a)(3)(B), 21 U.S.C.
§ 350h(a)(3)(B). The Food Safety Act also contains numerous provisions
regarding food processors, transporters, and foreign suppliers.
73. Id. § 105(a)(3)(D), (E), 21 U.S.C. § 350h(a)(3)(D), (E).
74. Id. § 105(a)(3)(A), (c)(1)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 350h(a)(3)(A), (c)(1)(B); see infra
note 180 and accompanying text (describing the industry preference for
flexibility).
75. Proposed Produce Safety Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 3638.
76. Id. at 3636.
77. Id. at 3635.
78. Id. at 3638.
79. In April 2011, a coalition of regional leafy green growers associations
came out in support of a national leafy green marketing agreement. See
Proposed National Marketing Agreement Regulating Leafy Green Vegetables;
Recommended Decision and Opportunity to File Written Exceptions to Proposed
Marketing Agreement No. 970, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,292, 24,292-93 (proposed Apr.
29, 2011) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 970) (noting that the proposed rule
followed a 2007 Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking responding to
industry interest in the establishment of a national marketing program and a
2009 petition for rulemaking submitted by a coalition of "producers, handlers,
and interested persons representing a cross section of the national fresh and
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adoption of Leafy Green Marketing-Agreement-like standards
during Food Safety Act rulemaking.8 0 The industry supported
federal action for three reasons. First, it sought to restore consumer
confidence in leafy greens.8 1  After the 2006 E. coli spinach
outbreak, per capita consumption of spinach fell by about twelve
percent. 82 Second, industry participants sought federal standards in
order to preempt the ongoing development of potentially stricter
retailer standards, which had created serious burdens and often
clashed with one another.8 3 A single grower could theoretically be
subject to multiple sets of standards and face inspection from
multiple auditors.8 4 Third, the industry sought to extend the same
requirements to other growers to level the playing field.85
fresh-cut produce industry") [hereinafter Proposed Leafy Green Marketing
Agreement]. The proposed rules codified the FDA's GAP guidance standards.
Id. at 24,335. After the FDA's publication of proposed Food Safety Act rules,
the USDA terminated the rulemaking process for this rule. Leafy Green
Vegetable Proposal, 78 Fed. Reg. 73,111 (proposed Dec. 5, 2013) (to be codified
at 7 C.F.R. pt. 970).
80. See Hass, supra note 41, at 86 (observing that the food industry,
including important trade groups such as the National Restaurant Association
and the Grocery Manufacturer's Association, supported the Food Safety Act).
81. Proposed Leafy Green Marketing Agreement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,293
(reporting that proponents for a national rule "stated that the proposed
agreement would minimize the potential for microbial contamination in
production and handling systems and would improve consumer confidence in
leafy green vegetables in the United States market"); see also id. at 24,323 ("A
measure of the benefit of the proposed program is the avoidance of lost sales.").
82. William K. Hallman et al., Public Response to the 2006 Recall of
Contaminated Spinach, in MICROBIAL SAFETY OF FRESH PRODUCE, supra note 50,
at 351, 365; see also Chryssa V. Deliganis, Death by Apple Juice: The Problem of
Foodborne Illness, the Regulatory Response, and Further Suggestions for
Reform, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 681, 712-14 (1998) (describing the public
response to the rise of outbreaks in the 1990s). Industry participants
acknowledge that development of private safety standards is "part of a 'process
to win back the confidence of consumers."' Stuart & Worosz, supra note 5, at
294. One "veteran food safety auditor" went so far as to say that "in his opinion,
about 70% of the items on food safety checklists are irrelevant to food safety."
Id.; see infra text accompanying note 160 (discussing the importance of
consumer perception).
83. Proposed Leafy Green Marketing Agreement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,299
(noting proponents' complaint about the "common practice among fresh produce
buyers to develop their own food safety requirements for producers and
handlers," as "these requirements often differ from buyer to buyer, resulting in
a complex web of private standards that ... [are] costly to the producer and
handler, and [are] often redundant").
84. Petersen, supra note 64, at 322 (noting that in the absence of a national
standard, it was not uncommon for the same operation to be audited multiple
times and required to satisfy different requirements of various buyers).
85. Proposed Leafy Green Marketing Agreement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,298
(justifying the need for a national agreement by referring to proponents'
statements that "a national program would allow for the coordination of audit
verifications for all fresh leafy green vegetables at a national level and would
allow for continuity of product quality as it moves between States"); id. (noting
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B. Trade-Offs
The adoption of produce safety regulations, which govern the
same farming practices that generate environmental risk, gives rise
to three types of trade-offs. First, it generates conflict because
farmers have limited resources. Implementing environmental
protection and food safety practices can be costly, so farmers will be
unable to take all steps that might be desirable. Second, it creates
inconsistencies between the goals of environmental protection and
food safety. Specifically, food safety regulation has collateral
consequences for the environment, exacerbating some of
agriculture's already severe environmental harms. Third, it creates
at least one direct trade-off for regulated entities, who may be
unable to participate in certain aspects of the USDA's
environmental programs as a result of the food safety program. The
discussion below elaborates on the latter two concerns and observes
that the approach to produce safety regulation misses some
potential opportunities for mutual reinforcing of food safety and
environmental goals. Because the federal produce safety
regulations are not yet finalized, this analysis relies on the
environmental consequences of the California Leafy Green
Marketing Agreement, which imposes similar requirements on
produce farmers.
1. Indirect Trade-Offs: Collateral Consequences
Some produce safety measures may have collateral
environmental consequences. Each of the main focuses of the safety
measures-elimination of wildlife, elimination of soil microbes, clean
water, worker hygiene, and food packaging-has collateral effects.86
This Subpart explores the environmental consequences of the food
safety approach to biological soil amendments (including compost
and manure).
The Food Safety Act's proposed regulations and their
predecessor schemes threaten soil microbial diversity through a
series of provisions aimed at discouraging the use of raw manure
and compost.87 Heavy application of synthetic fertilizers can reduce
that proponents for the rule argued that compliance with GAP outside of
California and Arizona was "inconsistent and limited").
86. The Food Safety Act directs the FDA to develop rules regarding each of
these categories. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act § 105(a)(3)(B), 21 U.S.C.
§ 350h(a)(3)(B) (2012). Other potential environmental impacts include
overreliance on and depletion of groundwater resources. See Notice of Intent to
Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Rule, Standards
for Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce for Human
Consumption, 78 Fed. Reg. 50,358, 50,359 (proposed Aug. 19, 2013) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 112).
87. For instance, they impose more stringent recordkeeping, testing,
processing, and storage requirements on compost and raw manure than on
synthetic fertilizer. COMMODITY SPECIFIc FOOD SAFETY GUIDELINES FOR THE
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both microbial biodiversity and microbial biomass. 8s At the same
time, application of compost and raw manure can increase both.89
Soil with reduced microbial diversity is less productive and can
be environmentally costly to cultivate because it requires higher
levels of fertilizer application. 90 "[H]ealthy soil is defined as a stable
system with resilience to stress, high biological diversity and high
PRODUCTION AND HARVEST OF LETTUCE AND LEAFY GREENS 31 (2013), available at
http://www.lgma.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/California-LGMA-metrics-
08-26-13-Final.pdf [hereinafter CALIFORNIA LEAFY GREENS MARKETING
AGREEMENT] (requiring management plans that govern the timing of
application, storage, source and quality, transportation, time and temperature
verification for compost processing, etc.). With regard to raw manure, many of
these safety guidelines discourage its use for raw produce fields altogether,
particularly where it is not possible to have a lengthy wait time between
application and harvest. Id. (suggesting no raw manure for lettuce or leafy
greens). The FDA GAP are more nuanced, suggesting that "[w]here it is not
possible to maximize the time between application and harvest, such as for
fresh produce crops which are harvested throughout most of the year, raw
manure should not be used." U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 64, at 23.
Although the USDA organic program recommends a wait time of 120 days
between application of raw manure and harvest of produce to be eaten raw,
many of the safety programs suggest substantially longer intervals. Compare
USDA Organic Foods Production Act Provisions, 7 C.F.R. § 205.203 (2014)
(requiring a 120-day interval for products whose edible portion makes direct
contact with the soil and a 90-day interval if the edible portion does not), with
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 64, at 23 (suggesting that growers allow
for approximately one year between the application of manure and harvest).
The original Proposed Produce Safety Rule recommended a nine-month
interval, but, bowing to pressure from farm and environmental interest groups,
the FDA eliminated the requirement, choosing instead to designate no specific
interval and to leave the issue for future resolution. Revised Proposed Produce
Safety Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 58,434, 58,472 (proposed Sept. 29, 2014) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 112) (leaving the requirement for future resolution);
Proposed Produce Safety Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 3504, 3637 (proposed Jan. 16, 2013)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 112) (requiring 9 months).
88. Alexander V. Semenov et al., Estimating the Stability of Escherichia
Coli 0157.'H7 Survival in Manure-Amended Soils with Different Management
Histories, 10 ENVTL. MICROBIOLOGY 1450, 1451 (2008) ("[Intensive farming
procedures, application of artificial fertilizers, herbicides, etc. [cause] [h]igh
levels of stress [that can] decrease microbial diversity.").
89. See, e.g., Mark Farrell et al., Microbial Diversity and Activity Are
Increased by Compost Amendment of Metal-Contaminated Soil, 71 FEMS
MICROBIOLOGY ECOLOGY 94, 98 (2010) (concluding that soil amendment with
compost increased microbial biodiversity more than did soil amendment with
synthetic fertilizer). But see Robert E. Mandrell, Enteric Human Pathogens
Associated with Fresh Produce: Sources, Transport, and Ecology, in MICROBIAL
SAFETY OF FRESH PRODUCE, supra note 50, at 5, 25 (explaining that manure-
amended soil appears to support the survival of some pathogens such as E. coli
0157:H7 and Salmonella).
90. Claire Kremen & Albie Miles, Ecosystem Services in Biologically
Diversified Versus Conventional Farming Systems: Benefits, Externalities, and
Trade-Offs, 17 ECOLOGY & SoC'Y Art. 40, 3 (2012), available at
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/voll7/iss4/art40/.
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levels of internal cycling of nutrients."9 1 In other words, healthy soil
is alive, not sterile. Healthy soil provides a variety of ecosystem
services, including nitrogen fixing and nutrient cycling, which
reduce the need for fertilizers. 92 Synthetic fertilizers are extremely
energy intensive; by minimizing the need for them, farms can reduce
substantially their overall energy footprints.93  Microbial
biodiversity is essential to the stability of the farm environment-
improving the ability of the soil to maintain productivity in the face
of external stressors.
In addition, discouraging the use of compost and manure
exacerbates an entirely different environmental externality related
to animal waste and farm energy use. Manure disposal is a serious
problem for all animal facilities. 94 Field application of compost and
manure is an essential part of the farm waste management puzzle.
Manure from meat and dairy production facilities itself poses a
threat to air and water, and limiting fields available for its disposal
worsens the problem. 95
2. A Direct Trade-Off: Forcing Farmers to Choose
In at least one instance, food safety regulation, as enforced, may
make it difficult for farmers to choose to implement the
environmental best practices prescribed by the EPA. This is an
example of what Cary Coglianese and others call "comparative
regulatory incoherence."96  Even where both regimes provide
flexibility, incompatibilities may arise at the back end, as inspectors
91. Semenov et al., supra note 88, at 1450.
92. Kremen & Miles, supra note 90, at 2; see also Semenov, supra note 88
(observing that increased biomass and biodiversity "increase[s] resilience and
resistance to stress").
93. ERNST WORRELL ET AL., ENERGY USE AND ENERGY INTENSITY OF THE U.S.
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 5 (2000), available at https://www.energystar.gov/ia
/business/industry/industrialLBNL-44314.pdf (noting that nitrogenous
fertilizer production is a "highly energy intensive process").
94. See sources cited supra note 23.
95. Among other problems, CAFO manure contributes significant
greenhouse-gas emissions. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 22, at 6-8
to 6-10; see also supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (describing other
aspects of the manure glut problem). Discouraging use is perhaps sensible with
regard to CAFO manure, which is far more likely to contain risky levels of
pathogens and likely also contains antibiotics, metals, and other contaminants.
THE CAFO READER: THE TRAGEDY OF INDUSTRIAL ANIMAL FACTORIES 84 (Daniel
Imhoff ed., 2010).
96. See Cary Coglianese, Bounded Evaluation: Cognition, Incoherence, and
Regulatory Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1219-20, 1236 (2002) ("[Ilnconsistent
decisions [are] likely, if not inevitable, when statutes and regulatory agencies
are created at different times and for different purposes."); see also Cass R.
Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1186
(2002) (discussing the inconsistency of agencies in levying fines imposed and in
deciding what enforcement actions to pursue).
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and other enforcement agents channel farmers into more prescribed
activities.
This incoherence is evident in the interaction between the
USDA's Conservation Stewardship Program and elements of food
safety regulations aimed at keeping wildlife off of farms. Through
the Conservation Stewardship Program, farmers can receive credit
for a variety of activities aimed at preserving farm habitats for wild
flora and fauna. 97  These habitats provide a variety of
environmental benefits including filtering runoff before it reaches
drinking water or aquatic habitats, reducing soil erosion, and
protecting biodiversity. 98  The Conservation Program provides
funding for a variety of wildlife habitat improvements. 99 Included
on the list of improvements are "[e]xtending existing field borders
97. 7 C.F.R. § 1470.1 (2012).
98. As these environmental programs indicate, farm habitat provides
environmental value, mitigating some of agriculture's environmental harms.
Specifically, habitat not only protects endangered species but also provides
ecosystem services. Kremen & Miles, supra note 90, at 1 (describing the
concepts of ecological and spatial diversity and their importance in the farm
environment). Many of these services are critical to farm productivity. For
instance, borderlands can provide habitat for pollinators thus reducing the need
for honeybee rental. Id. at 2. Borderlands can also protect soil and water
quality by preventing soil erosion. Melanie Beretti & Diana Stuart, Food Safety
and Environmental Quality Impose Conflicting Demands on Central Coast
Growers, 62 CAL. AGRIC. 68, 69 (2008). Robust ecosystem services reduce the
need for artificial inputs, including pollinators, fertilizers, and pesticides, which
each create their own environmental harms. Ecosystem services help maintain
resiliency to system shock, thereby preserving long-term productivity. Sasha
Gennet et al., Farm Practices for Food Safety: An Emerging Threat to
Floodplain and Riparian Ecosystems, 11 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV'T 236, 240
(2013); Kremen & Miles, supra note 90, at 2; see also Beretti & Stuart, supra, at
68. Planted (as opposed to bare dirt) borderlands and buffers also play an
important role in mitigating farm pollution. Specifically, borderlands can
reduce soil erosion and filter other pollutants, such as the chemical
contaminants in fertilizers and pesticides. Buffer Strips: Common Sense
Conservation, USDA NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, http://www.nrcs
.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/national/newsroom/features/?cid=nrcsl43_0235
68 (last visited Aug. 8, 2014). By reducing runoff, borderlands can protect
aquatic habitats and drinking water from contamination. To keep its drinking
water clean, the New York City Department of Environmental Protection
partners with farmers in the watershed, paying them to adopt these types of
best management practices to reduce runoff. Agriculture on Private Lands,
NYC ENVTL. PROTECTION, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/html/watershed
_protection/agriculture.shtml (last visited Aug. 1, 2014); See also James
Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 889-92 (2005) (describing New York City's program as a
successful example of a market for ecosystem services); see supra note 20 and
accompanying text (describing agriculture's threats to drinking water and
aquatic habitats). Borderlands can thereby reduce the need for other kinds of
expensive pollution controls and cleanup.
99. 7 C.F.R. § 1466.1 (2012).
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for water quality protection and wildlife habitat,"100 "[e]xtending
riparian forest buffers for water quality protection and wildlife
habitat,"10 1 "[w]ildlife friendly fencing," 10 2 "[r]enovation of a
windbreak, shelterbelt or hedgerow for wildlife habitat,"10 3 and
"[p]ollinator and/or beneficial insect habitat."10 4  The USDA
designed these conservation activities to "improve resource
conditions including soil quality, water quality, water quantity, air
quality, and habitat quality, as well as energy."'10 5
By contrast, both the California Leafy Green Marketing
Agreement and the Proposed Produce Safety Rule contain directives
100. NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL
ENHANCEMENT ACTIVITY-ANM07-EXTENDING EXISTING FIELD BORDERS FOR
WATER QUALITY PROTECTION AND WILDLIFE HABITAT (2014), available at
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/PANRCSConsumption/download?cid=stelprdb 12
40342&ext=pdf.
101. NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL
ENHANCEMENT ACTIVITY-ANM05-EXTENDING RIPARIAN FOREST BUFFERS FOR
WATER QUALITY PROTECTION AND WILDLIFE HABITAT (2014), available at
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/PANRCSConsumption/download?cid=stelprdb 12
40341&ext=pdf.
102. NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL
ENHANCEMENT ACTMTY-ANM27-WILDLIFE FRIENDLY FENCING (2014),
available at http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/PANRCSConsumption/download
?cid=stelprdbl240352&ext=pdf.
103. NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., PLANT
ENHANCEMENT ACTIVITY-PLT06-RENOVATION OF A WINDBREAK, SHELTERBELT
OR HEDGEROW FOR WILDLIFE HABITAT (2014), available at http://www.nrcs.usda
.gov/wps/PANRCSConsumption/download?cid=stelprdb1240401&ext=pdf.
104. NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., PLANT
ENHANCEMENT ACTivTY-PLT15-ESTABLISH POLLINATOR AND/OR BENEFICIAL
INSECT HABITAT (2014), available at http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/PA
_NRCSConsumption/download?cid=stelprdb1240402&ext=pdf.
105. Conservation Stewardship Program, USDA NAT. RESOURCES
CONSERVATION SERVICE, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main
/national/programs/financial/csp/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). Likewise,
California environmental laws contain similar directives. State water law
authorizes regional water boards to impose discharge requirements for any
water polluters-including nonpoint discharge from agricultural sources-or to
issue conditional waivers. Many of the regional water boards have issued
categorical conditional waivers for agricultural lands, which impose a variety of
conditions including educational requirements and conservation measures that
parallel those of the Conservation Stewardship Program. For instance,
California's Central Coast Water Board provides a conditional waiver for
farmers who agree to participate in a monitoring program and imposes some
minimal regulatory requirements for certain types of farms. See generally Cent.
Coast Reg'l Water Quality Control Bd., Irrigated Lands Regulatory Program,
CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/centralcoast
/water-issues/programs/ag-waivers/#resources (last visited Aug. 8, 2014)
(providing guidance to farmers on how to comply with the conditional waiver
requirements); Cent. Coast Reg'l Water Quality Control Bd., Irrigated Lands
Regulatory Program, CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.waterboards
.ca.gov/water issues/programs/agriculture/docs/about-agwaivers.pdf (last
visited Apr. 1, 2014) (describing the general program).
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discouraging many of those same practices. Reflecting the concern
that wild habitat within the farm environment may harbor animals
that may contaminate produce, these regimes encourage elimination
of that habitat. To minimize wildlife contact with produce, safety
auditors encourage such measures as "removal of vegetation that
would attract wild animals, removal of acreage from production to
create buffer zones from animals, [and] rodent control." 10 6  The
California Agreement requires a harvesting buffer zone surrounding
evidence of an animal incursion, such as scat or tracks.1 07 As a
result, if an inspector finds evidence of incursion, a farmer may have
to throw out a large amount of produce.10 8  The requirement
therefore creates a powerful financial incentive for farmers to
implement these wildlife exclusion measures. The FDA's Proposed
Produce Safety Rule follows this same path, containing incentives
that may encourage habitat elimination.10 9
The California Leafy Green Marketing Agreement
acknowledges the conflict but prioritizes food safety interests. The
Agreement notes that "[f]encing, vegetation removal, and
destruction of habitat may result in adverse impacts to the
environment," and directs farmers to "check for local, state, and
federal laws and regulations that protect riparian habitat and
wetland areas, restrict removal of vegetation or habitat, or regulate
wildlife deterrence measures, including hazing, harassment, lethal
and non-lethal removal, etc."110 At the same time, however, the
106. Cain, supra note 64, at 315.
107. CALIFORNIA LEAFY GREENS MARKETING AGREEMENT, supra note 87, at
47. Although the California Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement imposes only a
five-foot buffer, anecdotal evidence suggests that auditors and retailers impose
substantially larger buffers, requiring that all produce within a twenty-foot
radius be thrown away. Janet Raloff, Lettuce Liability: Programs to Keep
Salads Germfree Raise Wildlife and Conservation Concerns, 172 Sci. NEWS 362,
363 (2007).
108. Raloff, supra note 107.
109. Proposed Produce Safety Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 3504, 3638 (proposed Jan.
16, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 112) (imposing monitoring
requirements and requiring farmers to develop and implement wildlife
management plans). In revisions to the proposed regulations, the FDA clarified
"[tihis regulation does not require covered farms to take measures to exclude
animals from outdoor growing areas, or to destroy animal habitat or otherwise
clear farm borders around outdoor growing areas or drainages." Revised
Proposed Produce Safety Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 58,434, 58,473 (proposed Sept. 29,
2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 112). But this disclaimer does not alter the
incentives to do so and does not constrain private third-party inspectors from
recommending or requiring that farmers do so. See infra notes 116-24 and
accompanying text (describing the role of private third-party inspectors).
110. CALIFORNIA LEAFY GREENS MARKETING AGREEMENT, supra note 87, at
44. GAP contains a similar directive. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 64,
at 25 ("Federal, state, or local animal protection requirements must also be
considered. However, to the extent possible, where high concentrations of
wildlife are a concern, growers should consider establishing good agricultural
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Agreement defers to "the designated food safety professional" to
determine whether proximity to "animal harborage" constitutes a
threat of microbial contamination."1 1
On its face, the Proposed Produce Safety Rule does not
expressly limit farmers' ability to participate in environmental
programs. The reflexive element of the Food Safety Act regulations,
which allows farmers to select among menus of safety options and
tailor those options to individual farms, is meant to create flexibility
for farmers. 112 In theory, the delegation of broad discretion to local
inspectors and third-party auditors should maximize this flexibility.
Post-implementation evidence demonstrates, however, that ex
ante flexibility is insufficient where day-to-day enforcement curtails
variation. In practice, although inspectors may allow for significant
variation in how the law is implemented in different instances, they
do not necessarily maximize flexibility for individual farmers.
Flexibility hinges on the practices of individual inspectors, who each
have their own priorities, incentives, and limitations.11 Although
implementation might vary from one inspector to another, an
individual inspector might require exactly the same on-farm
modifications from each farmer under his or her purview.
Such lack of flexibility is particularly problematic where
inspectors over-enforce the law, forcing farmers to choose between
environmental programs and access to produce markets. 11 4 The
practices to deter or redirect wildlife to areas with crops that are not destined
for the fresh produce market.").
111. CALIFORNIA LEAFY GREENS MARKETING AGREEMENT, supra note 87, at
44.
112. Proposed Produce Safety Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 3531-32. The process
standards, which track GAP, also grant some flexibility by allowing farmers to
choose among various options or to adopt alternatives, so long as those
alternatives are scientifically justified. Eric Orts describes "[rieflexive law" as
"focus[ing] on influencing the 'self-referential' capacities of the social
institutions subject to regulation" and notes as examples "[a]dministrative
enforcement policies encourag[ing] companies to conduct self-evaluative
environmental audits" and "voluntary pollution prevention programs and
promot[ion of] internal monitoring." Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental
Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1231-33 (1995).
113. For farms with liability insurance, insurance companies may also limit
flexibility as a condition of maintaining the policy.
114. By over-enforcement, I mean forced adherence to a stringent and
specific set of requirements where the law should theoretically allow for more
flexibility and creativity. Under-enforcement is also a serious problem in the
food safety context. See Timothy D. Lytton & Lesley K. McAllister, Oversight in
Private Food Safety Auditing: Addressing Auditor Conflict of Interest, 2014 Wis.
L. REV. 289, 291-94. For instance, in 2011, just a few weeks before a listeria
outbreak was traced to a field of Jensen Farm cantaloupes, that farm received a
stellar audit report from a private auditor. See Dan Flynn, Jensen Brothers
Take Responsibility but Blame PrimusLabs, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Oct. 21, 2013),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/10/jensen-brothers-sue-primus-over-third-
party-audit-they-say-was-faulty/#.Ulghg-ZdWY. The auditor, whom the farm
hired at the request of its distributor, allegedly ignored some obvious safety
424 [Vol. 50
REGULATING FARMING
experience of farmers operating under the California Leafy Green
Marketing Agreement suggests that such over-enforcement may
occur frequently in produce fields. Auditors may require compliance
with more stringent standards than those required by law before
certifying growers for commercial buyers such as supermarkets. 115
For instance, although the Agreement prohibits harvest within
a five-foot radius of evidence of wildlife intrusion, farmers reported
that inspectors would reject produce from within a twenty-foot
radius. 116 Other farmers have reported pressure from inspectors to
build fencing and take other measures to exclude wildlife, even
where such measures were not absolutely required, and even where
they conflicted with conservation practices implemented under state
and federal programs. 117 Several studies of Central Valley and
Central Coast farmers in California, where private regulations have
been in place since about 2006, show sizable habitat losses. 118
Specifically, many farmers have removed habitat separating fields
from one another and from adjacent land uses, leaving behind bare
buffer strips. 119 Beyond the California Leafy Green Marketing
Agreement context, some farmers have reported facing resistance
from inspectors where farm-specific practices differed from standard
industry practices. 120
Inspectors have enormous power over farmers. They can shut
down entire operations or cause harvests to be rejected by retailers.
Although there are some limited opportunities to challenge
inspector determinations, successful appeals will often be resolved
too late for sale of the crops in question. Further, anecdotal
concerns. Id.; see infra note 124 (providing more detail about this incident).
This anecdote is in keeping with common critiques of inspection practices in the
organic farming context. There, commentators express concern that inspectors,
who are typically paid by farmers, have few incentives to engage in robust
enforcement.
115. These private standards are not publicly available, but anecdotal
information from interviews with farmers hints at their contents. Endres &
Johnson, supra note 67, at 64-65 (describing these "super-metrics").
116. Raloff, supra note 107.
117. Beretti & Stuart, supra note 98, at 71.
118. One survey indicated that 88.9 percent of farmers adopted at least one
measure to actively discourage or eliminate wildlife. Diana Stuart, Constrained
Choice and Ethical Dilemmas in Land Management: Environmental Quality
and Food Safety in California Agriculture, 22 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 53, 61
(2009).
119. Id. at 63-64 (characterizing the ethical dilemma that farmers face
between complying with environmental standards and complying with produce
safety standards).
120. JOEL SALATIN, EVERYTHING I WANT TO Do Is ILLEGAL: WAR STORIES FROM
THE LOCAL FOOD FRONT 28-48 (2007) (describing a farmer's experience with the
state inspector at an egg facility).
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evidence suggests that inspectors do not hesitate to remind farmers
of this power, thereby reducing farmer resistance. 121
Over-enforcement may be attributable to several factors. First,
inspectors are only human. Allowing for enforcement variation
makes their jobs more complicated and requires a much higher level
of expertise than does looking for a set list of safety features.
Ecosystems are extremely complex. 122 As many commentators have
recognized, regulating an ecosystem is difficult because
"[e]cosystems are dynamic, not static. They are subject to episodic
disturbances that shape and reshape them. Yet these natural
events are often difficult, and sometimes impossible, to predict." 123
In this context, allowing for flexibility requires inspectors to judge
the individual management decisions of each farmer, a task that
requires a close understanding of farm ecosystems.
Second, inspectors are limited by program goals and by their
own interpretation of these goals. The Food Safety Act and its
private precursors give inspectors only a food safety mandate.
Inspectors are not authorized to accept that a farmer made a
particular food safety decision to accommodate an environmental
concern. Environmental concerns are irrelevant from the inspector's
perspective. This is particularly true where the inspectors are also
121. See NAT'L SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COAL., RE: COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED
RULE FOR STANDARDS FOR THE GROWING, HARVESTING, PACKING, AND HOLDING OF
PRODUCE FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION 137-40 (2013), available at
http://sustainableagriculture.net/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/NSAC 
-Produce.
Rule-Comments-FINAL- 11-15-13.pdf (recounting experiences of several farmers
interacting with FDA inspectors).
122. J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive
System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental
Law, 34 HoUs. L. REV. 933, 940 (1997) (describing "environmental law [as]
fundamentally an endeavor to regulate many complex adaptive systems").
123. Charles F. Wilkinson, A Case Study in the Intersection of Law and
Science: The 1999 Report of the Committee of Scientists, 42 ARIz. L. REV. 307,
315 (2000). Agencies often try to manage complexity by making risk-averse
decisions. For instance, not understanding exactly what a species needed for
recovery, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the primary
administrator of the Endangered Species Act, recognized that in order to
prevent extinctions it must preserve large areas of endangered species habitat
because "habitat preserves options for a species' eventual recovery." Federico
Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the Endangered
Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 57-58 (1996) (quoting Determination of Critical
Habitat for the Colorado River Endangered Fishes: Razorback Sucker, Colorado
Squawfish, Humpback Chub, and Bonytail Chub, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,374, 13,377
(proposed Mar. 21, 1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17)) (identifying
"preserv[ing] options" as an essential function of critical habitat designations);
see also Jeffrey Rudd, The Forest Service's Epistemic Judgments: Enhancing
Transparency to Ensure "New Knowledge" Informs Agency Decision-Making
Processes, 23 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 145 (2004) (describing various reasons
for uncertainty and complexity in ecosystem science).
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worried about their own potential liability for food safety
outbreaks. 124
Although neither the environmental programs nor the food
safety programs mandate, on their faces, that farmers take any
specific action, the food safety program, as enforced, may force
farmers to choose between the two. As the response of farmers to
the California Leafy Green Marketing Agreement demonstrates, in
the face of such a choice, farmers are almost certain to adopt the
food safety practices that will maximize their market access.
3. Missed Opportunities
In addition to generating conflict with environmental goals, the
food safety regime misses some opportunities for complementarity.
That is, it is possible that environmental protection may also have
food safety benefits. Some recent studies point toward this
conclusion. These studies suggest that because border habitats are
a tool for water purification, they also play a critical role in produce
safety.125 Just as these "vegetative buffers" can reduce flow of
pollutants from fields to waterways, they can also reduce movement
of pathogenic organisms into irrigation waterways and onto fields. 126
For instance, buffer strips can be effective at limiting contamination
from one field to another, a particularly important function where a
field neighboring ready-to-eat produce is treated with raw
manure. 127 These studies demonstrate that despite the direction of
124. In 2013, the Jensen brothers, two farmers whose cantaloupes caused a
twenty-eight-state outbreak of listeria that killed thirty-three people, pleaded
guilty to selling adulterated food in interstate commerce. Flynn, supra note
114. They then sued PrimusLabs, a food safety consultant and auditor they had
hired to assess their fields and packing facilities. Id. Inspectors may also be
concerned that overly individualized treatment will create the perception of
corruption.
125. See Gennet et al., supra note 98; R. K. Koelsch et al., Vegetative
Treatment Systems for Management of Open Lot Runoff. Review of Literature,
22 APPLIED ENGINEERING AGRIC. 141, 141 (2006); Rita L. Nokes et al., Microbial
Water Quality Improvement by Small Scale On-Site Subsurface Wetland
Treatment, A38 J. ENVTL. Sci. & HEALTH 1849, 1849 (2003).
126. Gennet et al., supra note 98 ("Numerous studies have shown that non-
crop vegetation in and around fields can substantially reduce pollution and the
survival and movement of pathogens."). See generally Koelsch et al., supra note
125 (exploring the potential to use vegetative treatment systems as a CAFO
manure management strategy and determining that they can be equivalent to
conventional technologies); Nokes et al., supra note 125 (concluding that small-
scale, on-site subsurface wetlands can facilitate removal of enteric bacteria and
colphage such as giardia and cryptosporidium).
127. See, e.g., P. Cross et al., Eliciting Expert Opinion on the Effectiveness
and Practicality of Interventions in the Farm and Rural Environment to Reduce
Human Exposure to Escherichia Coli 0157, 140 EPIDEMIOLOGY & INFECTION 643,
651 (2011) (noting that buffer strips to separate fields with manure application
from ready to eat crops is an effective method for limiting contamination).
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recent food safety policy, food safety and environmental concerns are
not necessarily at odds.
A similar issue arises in the microbial diversity context.
Pathogen survival rates in farm soil depend on a variety of factors
tied to existing soil management practices, including bacterial
biodiversity and microbial biomass, nutrient loads, and soil
temperature. 128 Soil science research suggests that contaminants
such as E. coli have lower survival rates in a diverse and thriving
soil environment, perhaps because they struggle to compete with
other microbes. 129
In sum, many of the private and public standards that currently
govern on-farm produce safety practices generate direct conflict with
environmental programs and indirect conflict with environmental
goals. Further, the program misses the opportunity to further
environmental goals by ignoring potential complementarities
between food safety and environmental protection.
II. CHALLENGES TO ACHIEVING MULTI-GOAL REGULATION ON FARMS
The potential for significant trade-offs between food safety and
environmental protection invites questions about how, when, and by
whom those trade-offs are evaluated. Although the FDA complied
with its legal obligations to engage in reasoned trade-off analysis,
those efforts were inadequate. The FDA's trade-off analyses cannot
account for the fact that farmers make a broad range of decisions
about how they will change their behavior to comply with both food
safety and environmental programs. In exercising this flexibility, it
is ultimately farmers who will make significant trade-off decisions.
Further, even where trade-offs can be identified ex ante, it is
difficult to reach a resolution that can apply across the board.
Focusing on the rulemaking process, the Food Safety Act's
existing trade-off management tools ignore post-rulemaking events,
where prioritization between food safety and environmental goals
ultimately occurs. As a result, regulated entities are left to
themselves to prioritize between goals.
Absent adequate oversight, this allocation of decision making is
problematic because farmers are likely to be biased in favor of food
safety at the expense of environmental protection. They may thus
provide more of the former and less of the latter than is in the public
interest.
128. Semenov et al., supra note 88.
129. Xiuping Jiang et al., Fate of Escherichia Coli 0157:H7 in Manure-
Amended Soil, 68 APPLIED & ENVTL. MICROBIOLOGY 2605, 2608 (2002) (drawing
conclusions based on a study of manure amendments to sterilized and
unsterilized soils at various temperatures); Semenov et al., supra note 88, at
1455 ("[S]oils with higher microbial diversity are more resistant to stress and
disturbance, and consequently less susceptible to invasion.").
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A. The Food Safety Act's Trade-Off Management Tools
The Food Safety Act employs several trade-off management
tools that each fall short, in large part because none address the
underlying source of trade-off. Three of these tools-use of cost-
benefit analysis, compliance with the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA"), and the use of notice-and-comment
rulemaking-are standard rulemaking procedures.130 A fourth-a
congressional directive regarding the relationship between food
safety rulemaking and environmental programs-reflects an
attempt by Congress to anticipate and evaluate trade-offs before
they arise.131
1. Rulemaking for Multiple Regulatory Goals: Standard
Rulemaking Procedures
Built into the rulemaking process are a number of tools
designed to improve the quality of agency decision making regarding
trade-offs between competing regulatory priorities. Cost-benefit and
environmental impact analyses are meant to ensure that significant
rulemaking processes consider context beyond the narrow policy
goals of the particular agencies or statutes in question. 132 Notice-
and-comment rulemaking, in addition to other functions, provides
an opportunity for the general public to identify competing
regulatory priorities that the agency may have ignored or to which it
may not have given adequate consideration.133
For the Food Safety Act, none of these tools was adequate to
evaluate trade-offs between food safety and environmental
protection during the rulemaking process. Neither cost-benefit
analysis nor environmental impact analysis provided for
incorporation of information from individual farmers'
implementation choices. The notice-and-comment process was the
most effective of the three in directing the FDA to address
environmental concerns. This process afforded individual farmers
the opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process and
identify how the rules would affect their farming practices, but only
a small subset of farmers participated, and many who did were
focused not on the environmental consequences of the proposal, but
on the financial consequences.13 4
130. See infra Subpart III.B (describing rulemaking trade-off tools).
131. See infra Subpart II.A (describing pre-rulemaking trade-off tools).
132. See infra Subpart III.B.1 (elaborating on the central role of these types
of tools).
133. See infra Subpart III.B.1-2 (exploring further how notice-and-comment
rulemaking functions as a tool for forcing an agency to consider competing
regulatory goals).
134. To view the comments generated by the notice-and-comment process,
see Standards for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing and Holding of Produce for
Human Consumption, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#
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In its cost-benefit analysis, the FDA concluded that the benefits
of the proposed rule, estimated at $1036.4 million, would outweigh
the expected costs, estimated at $630.21 million. 135 But the cost
estimate included only direct economic effects-industry compliance
costs. 136 The document considered no ancillary costs or benefits. 
137
It is impossible to know in the abstract whether a more robust
cost-benefit analysis would have led to a different outcome. If it did
not, it would provide a better justification for the Food Safety Act
regulations, providing the FDA ammunition to argue that the Food
Safety Act's environmental costs, discussed in Part I, are
outweighed by its public health benefits. More likely, however,
inclusion of environmental costs would counsel toward revision of at
least some parts of the Proposed Produce Safety Rule. Wildlife
exclusion rules are a potential example. Rules seeking exclusion of
wild animals from farm environments threaten biodiversity and
could worsen agriculture's effect on aquatic habitats and drinking
water.138 Evidence that wildlife poses a serious threat, particularly
in regions without CAFOs, is weak. 139 A cost-benefit analysis that
accounts for environmental costs might not justify application of
these rules in non-CAFO regions, whereas analysis without
environmental costs did.140 Other aspects of the rule, such as the
!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=O;dct=PS;D=FDA-2011-N-0921;refD=FDA-2011-N-
0921-0001 (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
135. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS-
STANDARDS FOR THE GROWING, HARVESTING, PACKING AND HOLDING OF PRODUCE
FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION 313 (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov
/downloads/Food/FoodSafety/FSMAUCM334116.pdf (providing the estimated
mean net costs and net benefits of the proposed Regulatory Flexibility Act).
136. The FDA considers labor costs, compliance estimates, and estimates of
baseline industry practices. Id. at 5.
137. Id. at 297-98.
138. See supra Part I.B (describing these interactions).
139. Experts agree that, at best, there is uncertainty about the role that wild
animals play in contamination. Evidence suggests that their role is limited,
and where they do play a role, the critical factor may actually relate to their
interaction with cattle and human contamination sources. Sanja Ilic et al., A
Scoping Study Characterizing Prevalence, Risk Factor and Intervention
Research, Published Between 1990 and 2010, for Microbial Hazards in Leafy
Green Vegetables, 23 FOOD CONTROL 7, 18 (2012) (reviewing literature and
concluding that various studies identifying animal manure as a risk factor are
methodologically flawed); Jeff A. Langholz & Michele T. Jay-Russell, Potential
Role of Wildlife in Pathogenic Contamination of Fresh Produce, 7 HUM.-
WILDLIFE INTERACTIONS 140, 140, 151 (2013) (concluding that "although
pathogen prevalence has been documented in wildlife at overall low levels, the
potential role that wildlife and its habitat play in pathogenic contamination
remains unclear and is interwoven with pathogenic risk from human and
domesticated animal sources" and finding that many studies showing wildlife
contamination were not methodologically sound).
140. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 135, at 70-80.
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requirements that employees have access to and use adequate
handwashing facilities, would likely survive more robust analysis.l"
This analysis begs the question: If the environmental costs are
so severe, why did the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
("OIRA") approve the cost-benefit analysis? After all, the analysis
itself acknowledges that the two executive orders that mandate the
cost-benefit analysis process require the regulation to maximize net
benefits to society, including potential environmental costs and
benefits. 142  There are several possible explanations for OIRA's
decision. One is that OIRA and the FDA simply ran out of time.
The Food Safety Act imposes tight deadlines for the FDA to
complete rulemaking. 143 Although OIRA is not directly bound by
that deadline, it may have felt pressure to complete the review,
which was already bogged down by the very complicated and
technical assessment weighing industry compliance costs against
the public health benefits of compliance.
OIRA may also have determined that the environmental costs
were too speculative to quantify. Most of the environmental costs
described in Subpart I.B follow not from the express directives of the
proposed regulations, but from the choices that farmers (and,
perhaps more importantly, inspectors and auditors) will make
during implementation and enforcement. Although the experience
of farmers in California implementing that state's Leafy Green
Marketing Agreement provides strong evidence that environmental
consequences will be significant, numerically estimating the precise
scope of those consequences involves large uncertainties. For
instance, with regard to lost habitat, any potential estimate of the
number of acres of planted buffer strips that might be stripped bare
would be wildly speculative. So, likewise, would be any estimate as
to how many farmers will switch from biological to synthetic
141. Some experts estimate that requiring hand washing may be one of the
most effective measures for reducing risks of foodborne illness. See Cross et al.,
supra note 127, at 649 (identifying hand washing as one of the most practical of
evaluated expenditures).
142. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 135, at 2; see also Exec. Order
No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011) (mandating that agencies "select,
in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, those approaches that
maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public
health and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity)").
143. 21 U.S.C. § 350h(a)(1)(A) (2012) (giving the agency one year from the
passage of the statute to publish draft rules); id. § 350h(b)(1) (giving the agency
one year from the close of the public comment period on the draft to publish a
final rule). The Center for Food Safety brought litigation to enforce these
requirements, which resulted in a settlement agreement in which the FDA
promised to publish final regulations by October 31, 2015. See Press Release,
Ctr. for Food Safety, Victory! Your Food Will Be Safer Thanks to Center for
Food Safety Lawsuit (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/press-
releases/2919/victory-your-food-will-be-safer-thanks-to-center-for-food-safety-
lawsuit.
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fertilizers. Thus, although it is certain that there will be
environmental costs, it is nearly impossible to know, before the
regulations are implemented and individual farmers are surveyed,
how extensive those will be. A related concern is that the cost-
benefit analysis assesses costs and benefits in the aggregate.
Accordingly, even accounting for environmental costs, it may find a
rule is cost-justified overall, even when applications in particular
regions or on particular farms may not be. 144
Like the executive orders, NEPA requires the rulemaking
agency to assess a rule's potential effects prior to implementation. 145
Unlike the cost-benefit analysis process, which typically requires
translation of both costs and benefits into dollar figures, an
environmental impact statement can rely on a more qualitative
analysis.146 Nevertheless, it remains inadequate in the Food Safety
Act context for two reasons. First, as a practical matter, the FDA's
environmental analysis may come too late to shape the rulemaking.
The agency operated during the early stages of rulemaking under
the presumption that no analysis was required. 47 It eventually
recognized its obligations many months after publishing a proposed
rule.1 48  Although it remains possible that the environmental
analysis will shape the final rule, its effects are unlikely to be
substantial.
Second, as with the cost-benefit analysis, because the precise
details of the regulatory scheme will be determined after
rulemaking by regulated entities themselves, the complete reliance
on ex ante analysis is questionable. Indeed, environmental law
scholars criticize the statute for directing agencies to conduct an
144. See infra Subpart II.B.2 (elaborating on this concern and providing
examples).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012).
146. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2 (2012).
147. When it published the proposed rule in January 2013, the FDA
determined that a "categorical exclusion" applied, thus eliminating the need to
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement. Environmental Impact
Statement for the Proposed Rule, Standards for Growing, Harvesting, Packing,
and Holding of Produce for Human Consumption; Public Meeting on Scoping of
Environmental Impact Statement and Extension of Comment Period for
Environmental Impact Statement, 79 Fed. Reg. 13,593, 13,593 (proposed Mar.
11, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 16, 112).
148. Ultimately, however, the agency agreed to draft an environmental
impact statement. On August 19, 2013, it published a Notice of Intent to
Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement. Notice of Intent to Prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Rule, Standards for
Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce for Human
Consumption, 78 Fed. Reg. 50,358, 50,359 (proposed Aug. 19, 2013) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 112). The FDA estimates publication of a draft by
December 2014. At this stage, any potential benefit to be gained from reducing
environmental impacts in order to avoid more onerous NEPA analysis was lost.
See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that many
NEPA supporters see this incentive as its primary environmental benefit).
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analysis at a single point in time. 149 Noting that modern approaches
to environmental management are adaptive-designed to develop
over time in response to changing circumstances-scholars argue
that environmental analysis should likewise change over time. 150
In sum, although cost-benefit and environmental analyses
provide the FDA the opportunity to identify broadly the types of
environmental harm that could occur, neither mechanism is well
suited to account for how costs will arise on individual farms. 151
The notice-and-comment process fares better. Because it
provides an opportunity for regulated entities to tell an agency how
they will change their behavior in response to proposed regulations,
it gives the agency a chance to evaluate whether those reactions
achieve the appropriate balance between competing regulatory
priorities.
In this case, the FDA made a number of significant changes to
the proposed rules in response to concerns raised by farmers (and
non-governmental organizations and trade groups). 152 For instance,
many farmers expressed concern over a proposed waiting period
between the application of raw manure to a produce field and
harvest. 153 The concern was both environmental and financial. In
response, the FDA eliminated the waiting requirement.
Although the notice-and-comment process may have reduced
the environmental costs of the rule, it does not entirely account for
the rule's delegation of decision-making, and, in particular, trade-
off-making authority to farmers. The inability to address this
149. See RuhI & Salzman, supra note 29, at 98 (arguing that adaptive
management "rejects NEPA's premise that the cumulative effects caused by and
affecting an action over time can be reliably predicted at the time the action is
designed").
150. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring
and Managing Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
903, 906 (2002) ("NEPA has now settled into a quiescent and underproductive
middle age .... It is time, I shall argue, for a new shake-up.").
151. See infra Subpart II.B (exploring this conclusion in more depth).
152. Compare Proposed Produce Safety Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 3504, 3506
(proposed Jan. 16, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 16, 112), with Revised
Proposed Produce Safety Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 58,434, 58,436 (proposed Sept. 29,
2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 112) (proposing amendments to the
January 16, 2013 Proposed Produce Safety Rule).
153. For examples of these concerns, see Carolina Farm Stewardship Ass'n,
Comment to Proposed Produce Safety Rule, at 48-50 (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2011-N-0921-0561; Chert
Hollow Farm, LLC, Comment to Proposed Produce Safety Rule, at 5-6 (Nov. 14,
2013), http://www.regulations.govl#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2011-N-0921-0487;
Future Harvest-A Chesapeake Alliance for Sustainable Agric., Comment to
Proposed Produce Safety Rule, at 4-5 (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2011-N-0921-0610; Nat'l
Sustainable Agric. Coal., Comment to Proposed Produce Safety Rule, at 7 (Nov.
15, 2013), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2011-N-0921-
0451.
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problem was due to the fact that, while all farmers will ultimately
make trade-offs between food safety and environmental protection,
few weighed in on this concern in particular. Instead, most farmers
were concerned about the Proposed Produce Safety Rule's feasibility
and compliance costs. The notice-and-comment process works well
to protect regulatory goals that regulated entities share, but, as
here, where many farmers were not primarily concerned with
environmental outcomes, the notice-and-comment process will not
necessarily reveal the full range of potential environmental costs of
the proposed rule.
2. The Food Safety Act's Environmental Directive
In drafting the Food Safety Act, Congress recognized the
inevitable interaction between safety programs and environmental
concerns. Mandating a balance between these two interests,
Congress directed the FDA to draft produce safety regulations that
"take into consideration, consistent with ensuring enforceable public
health protection, conservation and environmental practice
standards and policies established by Federal natural resource
conservation, wildlife conservation, and environmental agencies." 15 4
This instruction gives the FDA authority to take environmental
consequences into account (particularly as they implicate
participation in the environmental programs of other agencies).
The directive's primary failure is its focus on the FDA rather
than on regulated entities. Neither Congress nor the FDA instructs
regulated entities to consider environmental effects when
implementing food safety regulations. The mandate is weak
because it is excluded from the reflexive parts of the law-the parts
that ask farmers to evaluate and improve their own practices-and
is included only as an ex ante consideration for the FDA.155 Again,
as with the analytical tools discussed above, this effort at trade-off
management puts the onus of considering environmental effects on
the regulatory agency despite the fact that the structure of the
regulatory scheme shifts substantial regulatory authority to private
parties.
B. Trade-Off Management Challenges
The underlying problem in the Food Safety Act's approach to
trade-off management is that none of the tools provide express
oversight of the farmers and inspectors who are, in fact, making the
decisions that ultimately impose environmental costs. The Act's
154. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, 21 U.S.C. § 350h(a)(3)(D) (2012).
155. The weakness of this mandate likely reflects Congress's lack of interest
in aggressive environmental regulation. See supra text accompanying notes
34-35 (describing congressional resistance to environmental regulation of
agriculture).
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trade-off management toolkit has not yet caught up with recent
innovations in the regulatory toolkit. Cooperative governance seeks
to promote efficiency by inviting regulated entities to police
themselves. 156 This innovation can have numerous benefits, but
may also have unforeseen costs if trade-off management tools are
not adapted to match. Two aspects of the agriculture industry
justify the need to rethink how trade-off management occurs within
cooperative governance schemes. First, where existing tools fail at
identifying trade-offs ex ante, those trade-offs are left to regulated
entities to resolve. Because of their own economic motivations,
however, farmers are poorly situated to balance food safety and
environmental protection in a manner consistent with the public
interest. Second, because of the large number of farms and
variation in farming conditions and practices, trade-offs are difficult
to resolve on an industry-wide basis.
1. Structural Bias in Favor of Food Safety
The structure of agricultural regulation makes it more difficult
for farmers to protect the environment, even if they want to. Not
only are many aspects of environmental regulations voluntary, but
both environmental and food safety regimes rely on cooperative
governance, leaving regulated entities the authority to flesh out
many of the details of the regulatory regimes. Farmers have
flexibility to reconcile food safety and environmental protection
goals in a manner suited to the individual farmer's best interests.
This delegation is problematic because neither farmers, nor food
safety auditors and inspectors, are well positioned to conduct this
balancing. Indeed, as the next few paragraphs will explain, farmers
have numerous reasons to prioritize food safety over environmental
protection.
Food safety is primarily a private good. As the consumer
response to the E. coli spinach outbreak indicates, when consumers
determine a product is unsafe, they spend their money elsewhere. 15 7
Surveys also suggest that consumers are willing to pay more for safe
156. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private
Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56
DUKE L.J. 377, 377 (2006); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6 (1997) ("[T]he goals of efficacy and
legitimacy are better served by a model that views the administrative process
as a problem-solving exercise in which parties share responsibility for all stages
of the rule-making process."); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89
MINN. L. REV. 342, 362-64 (2004).
157. See Deliganis, supra note 82, at 693-94 (stating that beverage company
Odwalla's sales had not yet recovered two years after a highly publicized E. coli
outbreak tied to the company's apple juice); Hallman et al., supra note 82
(noting that after the 2006 E. coli spinach outbreak, per capita consumption of
spinach fell by about twelve percent).
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food.158 Environmental protection, by contrast, is a public good, for
which fewer consumers are willing to pay more. 159 Accordingly,
most industry participants prioritize food safety over environmental
protection, particularly where retailers have pressed for better
safety practices. 160
For growers, maintaining food safety standards can be essential
to maintaining access to markets. Responding to a rise in produce-
related foodborne illnesses in the 1980s and 1990s, retailers began
enforcing their own standards or requiring GAP certification. 161 The
2006 spinach outbreak, which led to a nationwide recall, accelerated
industry efforts.1 62 Seeking to restore consumer confidence and to
158. Denis W. Stearns, On (Cr)edibility: Why Food in the United States May
Never Be Safe, 21 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 245, 253 & n.28 (2010) (noting that
consumers are willing to pay more for safe food).
159. See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen
Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377, 382 n.10
(1998) (noting that only one percent of Americans who profess concern for
environmental issues donates to environmental organizations, and even the one
percent who contribute spend an average of only around $10 per person, per
year).
160. But see Endres & Johnson, supra note 67, at 55 (explaining why
consumers cannot tell whether food is safe); Stearns, supra note 158, at 253-54
(arguing that industry participants have little incentive to protect food safety
because consumers cannot tell the difference between safe and unsafe food).
Perhaps more important to producers than whether consumers can tell if food is
safe is whether consumers believe food to be safe. Accordingly, producers have
a stake in making it look as if they are taking action. Outbreaks can be
extremely costly, not only because people get sick, but also because people stop
buying the implicated product, regardless of its source. See REJESUS, supra note
66 (providing case studies of spinach, cantaloupe, and green onions to
demonstrate the significant impact of outbreaks and FDA recalls on consumer
demand). Given that industry has emphasized the importance of restoring
consumer confidence, industry participants acknowledge that a primary
strategy is the appearance of eliminating risk. Stuart & Worosz, supra note 5
("Participants of the [California Leafy Green Marketing Agreement] rule-
making process admitted there was a lack of scientific evidence to support rules
and that certain measures were included because they 'look good' rather than
known effectiveness"); see also Stuart, supra note 118, at 58 ("Competition
between firms, fear of litigation, and/or a tarnished brand name may be driving
these industry food safety standards that do not have scientific support.").
Producers have strong incentives to take visible food safety steps. Cf. Stearns,
supra note 158, at 253-54 (noting that because consumers will not pay for an
attribute that they cannot verify, producers have no incentive to take safety
measures that are not visible).
161. See Deliganis, supra note 82, at 688-89 (1998) (describing the rise of
foodborne illnesses and discovery of new pathogens); supra notes 65-66 and
accompanying text (recounting the rise of retailer enforcement of GAP). As of
2010, 1073 farms were GAP certified by USDA auditors. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., supra note 135, at 35.
162. Eighty-seven percent of Americans were aware of the recall. Hallman
et al., supra note 82, at 354; see also Powell et al., supra note 50, at 377
(characterizing the 2006 spinach outbreak as a tipping point for regulation of
produce).
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avoid state-level legislation, California leafy greens marketers
developed the California Leafy Green Marketing Agreement. 163
Under the current scheme, both FDA inspectors and private,
third-party auditors have poor incentives to protect environmental
interests. 164 Agency inspectors are bound only by the FDA's food
safety mission. 165  Private auditors, who may face liability for
outbreaks, likewise have no environmental mandate. 166 Neither
inspectors nor auditors have any reason to accept a farmer's
explanation that he or she made a particular choice in the interest of
environmental protection.
Although there is a growing market for "environmentally
friendly" food, farmers with unbridled poor environmental practices
face fewer incentives to adopt environmental improvements than
they do to adopt food safety improvements. Because retailers are
not systematically ensuring compliance with environmental best
practices, there is no parallel risk of losing market access. 1
67
Compounding the potential for loss of market access is the
potential for criminal and civil liability for food safety failures.
163. Some California legislators attempted to take action to implement a
public response, but the industry, with the support of then-Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger, acted quickly to implement its own response in order to
preempt the need for state action. Varun Shekhar, Produce Exceptionalism:
Examining the Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement and Its Ability to Improve
Food Safety, 6 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 267, 280-82 & n.69 (2010) (describing the
California legislature's postoutbreak effort as well as the industry and
gubernatorial responses); see also Endres & Johnson, supra note 67, at 66
(describing the origins of the California Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement).
The agreement is quasi-public; the California Department of Food and
Agriculture is a party to the agreement and determines whether growers and
handlers are in compliance, but the standards are determined by a Leafy
Greens Advisor Board that is primarily comprised of industry participants.
Shekhar, supra, at 283-84, 290 & n.76. Although state agriculture agencies
play an enforcement role, private industry participants led the standard-
development process, which was done behind closed doors. Id. at 283-84, 290
n.99.
164. Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions
of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 16 (2009) (arguing that
agency employees have an incentive to focus on measurable outcomes because
they are visible measures of employee performance); see also supra Subpart
I.B.2 (regarding inspectors motives to prioritize food safety).
165. CFSAN-What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov
/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofFoods/CFSAN/WhatWeDo/ (last visited Mar.
16, 2015).
166. See Orts, supra note 112, at 1322-23 (arguing that the EPA should
preside over auditors).
167. Some scholars have called for development of robust environmental
certification schemes to allow consumers to penalize producers for failure to
adhere to environmental standards. See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki, The Future of
Food Eco-Labeling: Organic, Carbon Footprint, and Environmental Life-Cycle
Analysis, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 5-6 (2011) (discussing both public and private
eco-labeling efforts).
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Farmers who sell contaminated produce face strict liability for
resulting harms. 168 They may also be subject to the Federal Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act's various enforcement mechanisms including
product seizure, mandatory recall, and criminal penalties. 169
Parallel risk of prosecution (civil or criminal) for environmental
harms is minimal. 170
Further, the Food Safety Act's produce safety regulations create
additional financial incentives for farmers to prioritize food safety.
They do so by making risk-averse approaches to food safety more
cost effective than environmentally friendly alternatives. For
instance, the regulations increase the costs of using reusable
packaging materials (such as crates used to bring goods to market)
by imposing additional sanitation requirements that do not apply to
new packaging. 171 This preference for single-use packaging over
reusable packaging imposes resource costs, requiring additional raw
materials and increasing waste. 172
The result is that food safety will win out most of the time,
regardless of whether it is the more important policy priority (no
matter the metric for determining importance), and, perhaps, even
regardless of whether the farmer values environmental protection.
2. Roadblocks to Resolving Trade-Offs During Rulemaking
Even where it is possible to identify trade-offs with precision
during rulemaking, it may be difficult to determine in the aggregate
how they ought to be resolved. Because there is substantial
variation from one farm to the next, the extent to which a particular
practice poses either a safety or an environmental concern also
168. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (1998); see, e.g., Estate
of Stanley Pinkham v. Cargill, Inc., 55 A.3d 1, 5-6 (Me. 2012) (describing
standard for applying strict liability test to food products).
169. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 332-334 (2012)
(providing injunctions, criminal penalties, and seizure as enforcement
mechanisms). The Food Safety Act amended the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
to add mandatory recall authority. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-353, § 206(a), 124 Stat. 3885, 3939-40 (2011) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 350/).
170. Farmers can face prosecution for a narrow range of environmental
harms including "takes" of endangered species. See Endangered Species Act of
1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2012) (making it unlawful for any person to "take"
an endangered species within the United States); id. § 1538(a)(1)(A) (defining
"take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct"); id. § 1540(a), (b)
(providing for civil penalties and criminal prosecution against "any person who
knowingly violates" any provision of the Endangered Species Act).
171. Proposed Produce Safety Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 3406, 3589 (proposed Jan.
16, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 112).
172. For discussion of other examples of regulations that create incentives
for farmers to increase their environmental footprints, see supra Subpart I.B.1
(discussing indirect trade-offs).
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varies. For instance, a farm adjacent to a stream that feeds a
municipal water source may want to prioritize use of a buffer strip
to filter any potential runoff into that stream. By contrast, a farm
near a CAFO might prioritize eliminating any potential habitat for,
and building fences against, wild animals that might be tracking
contaminants from the animal farm. Cooperative governance is
intended to provide just this type of flexibility. 173 Another way to
put this is that although an across-the-board rule might be cost
justified, it may be less cost effective than a rule that was tailored to
farm-specific circumstances.
From an environmental perspective, preserving farm-level
flexibility is extremely important. Despite significant research into
methods for increasing crop yields, much remains unknown
regarding the sustainability of those yields. 174 In the last century,
agricultural scientists have developed techniques to dramatically
173. See, e.g., Bamberger, supra note 156, at 380 ("Risk, in particular, arises
from the interplay of a variety of factors and manifests itself differently in
heterogeneous firms. Its regulation, therefore, often cannot be boiled down to
uniform rules governing behavior or mandating particular measurable
outcomes."). The main concern, and it is a serious one, about cooperative
governance is that it results in a significant lack of agency control over
regulatory outcomes because it relies too much on entities whose economic self-
interest often conflicts with public interests. Id. at 393 (describing the
"prevailing model" of firm behavior as amoral actors seeking to maximize
profit). This critique may undermine the viability of some cooperative
governance schemes, but, for the purposes of this Article, I accept that
cooperative governance is the current status quo for agricultural regulation and
ask, within the confines of that scheme, how decision making regarding trade-
offs might be improved. See id. at 399-400 (arguing that the prevailing model
of firms as amoral actors begins to break down as it becomes less clear how to
follow legal directives and identifying a variety of mechanisms for encouraging
firms to make decisions more aligned with the public interest within the context
of cooperative-governance schemes).
174. This is sustainability in the strictest sense: Can current yield levels be
maintained? There are two basic camps regarding the best approach to this
type of sustainability. The first advocates for precision farming, a large-scale
mode of industrialized agriculture that makes use of sensors and other tracking
technology to direct inputs-water, fertilizer, pesticides-precisely where they
are needed. The second advocates for a return to smaller scale-one that is
more labor-intensive-production that follows what agrarian advocate Wes
Jackson calls "nature as measure," to the extent possible, mimicking natural
ecosystems. WES JACKSON, BECOMING NATIVE TO THIS PLACE 61-86 (1994). Both
modes are subject to significant critiques. Neither mode promises the silver
bullet to the environmental harms of agriculture. The best solutions likely lie
somewhere in the middle. An environmentally sound (i.e. sustainable) farm
system is defined not by a particular set of practices, but by resilience to shock
and capability to produce food for generations to come. There is no one farming
practice or set of practices that ought to be prescribed. Indeed, dramatically
different types of farm systems can theoretically be sustainable. ROBERT
PAARLBERG, FOOD POLITICS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 112, 115-16
(2010); William S. Eubanks III, Achieving a Sustainable Farm Bill, in FOOD,
AGRICULTURE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 6, at 265, 265-66.
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increase crop yields. 175  Because many of these strategies are
resource intensive, some scientists now question whether these
methods will continue to be productive going forward as water, soil,
and fossil-fuel resources are exhausted. 176  In light of this
uncertainty, flexibility is important because it allows for
experimentation and for preservation of various agricultural
techniques.177
175. In the twentieth century, a coalition of international anti-hunger
advocates expended enormous resources to bioengineer wheat and rice plants
that would be more productive. Culminating in what is known as the "Green
Revolution," these efforts resulted in dramatic increases not only to agricultural
production but also to use of chemical inputs and mechanical planting and
harvesting. This "productivist" approach to farming reduced food prices and
has been celebrated for forestalling famine in many places around the world.
Many critics of the Green Revolution cite it as one of the root causes of global
inequality and food insecurity, claiming that it increased rural inequality and
reduced crop diversity. Carmen G. Gonzalez, Climate Change, Food Security,
and Agrobiodiversity: Toward a Just, Resilient, and Sustainable Food System,
22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 493, 502, 506-07 (2011) (identifying a legacy of
colonial settlement and financial restructuring driven by the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund as other causes of food insecurity in
developing nations). The Green Revolution shifted production from produce
crops to commodity crops such as wheat and rice, thus further fostering
dependence of the global south on the north. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 31.
Even proponents of the Green Revolution now recognize that its results are
environmentally unsustainable and that any future increases in productivity
will require more than genetic modification and chemical inputs. GORDON
CONWAY, THE DOUBLY GREEN REVOLUTION: FOOD FOR ALL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 41 (1997) ("The new Green Revolution must not only benefit the poor
more directly, but must be applicable under highly diverse conditions and be
environmentally sustainable. By implication, it must make greater use of
indigenous resources, complemented by a far more judicious use of external
inputs.").
176. A related concern is that the reliance on monoculture and a narrow
range of crop species makes agricultural operations more susceptible to the
risks associated with climate change, including the spread of pests and disease.
See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (discussing this concern).
177. The goal of preserving options for the future is inherent in the very
concept of sustainability, a framework that seeks to regulate present behavior
in order to preserve options for future generations. Uncertainty about future
environmental conditions also necessitates preserving regulatory flexibility.
For instance, water law scholars point to uncertainty regarding future water
demand and availability to justify development of a water ownership and
distribution scheme that can allow for a variety of scenarios. See, e.g., Kathleen
A. Miller, Grappling with Uncertainty: Water Planning and Policy in a
Changing Climate, 5 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 395, 410-11 (2010)
("[W]hen faced with profound uncertainty, one might want to adopt a decision
rule that focuses on minimizing the chances of committing to a decision that one
would later regret."). Option preservation has also been recognized as a facet of
natural resource valuation. Where there is uncertainty about a resource's
potential future uses, it has a "[q]uasi-option value [which] measures the value
of preserving options for later use given an expectation of improved knowledge
in the future." Wendy Oram & Clay Valverde, Note, Legal Protection of Surf
Breaks: Putting the Brakes on Destruction of Surf, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 401, 413
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Further, because of geographic variation (in topography,
hydrology, climate, crops grown, etc.), environmentally appropriate
practices vary from farm to farm. A practice that is benign in one
area may be highly destructive elsewhere. Thus, depending on the
location of the farm, among other factors, the cost-benefit analysis
for adopting a particular practice could turn out quite differently.
For example, discussing nutrient runoff, USDA economists Jan
Lewandrowski and Kevin Ingram considered some potential costs
and benefits of taxing nitrogen, an essential nutrient:
[A] tax on nitrogen, if set high enough, would reduce nitrogen
runoff from crop lands and thus could help address habitat
degradation problems in areas like the Chesapeake Bay ....
Such a tax, however, would also raise production costs for
producers whose use of fertilizers does not contribute to these
(or other) water quality problems. 178
On the food safety side, even industry proponents of national
produce safety regulation have expressed the need for flexibility to
account for differences in, for example, "water sources, geography,
climate, or size of operation," any of which could "require slight
variations in the types of actions needed to be taken" to achieve
compliance.179
Where two goals-environmental protection and food safety-
conflict, which should win out? This variation suggests that
prioritization may be difficult to do in the aggregate without farm-
specific information. Making such a determination requires a case-
specific analysis. The next Part searches the existing toolbox of
(1994). In the agriculture context, preservation of alternative agriculture
techniques preserves the potential that one of these techniques may turn out to
be essential to ongoing food production. Another example of this arises in the
nuclear fuel context. Responding to debates about how and where to bury spent
fuel, Richard Stewart has argued for a flexible approach acknowledging the
possibility that spent fuel may ultimately prove to be a useful resource.
Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Nuclear Waste Law and Policy: Fixing a Bankrupt
System, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 783, 784 (2008) ("[Rleprocessing represents a
valuable option that should not be foreclosed without good reason. A
precautionary approach to nuclear waste policy would preserve options and not
be quick to bury nuclear wastes.").
178. Jan Lewandrowski & Kevin Ingram, Policy Considerations for
Increasing Compatibilities Between Agriculture and Wildlife, 39 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 229, 245 (1999).
179. Proposed Leafy Green Marketing Agreement, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,292,
24,299 (proposed Apr. 29, 2011) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 970); see also id. at
24,300 (noting that opponents to a national leafy green marketing agreement
were concerned that it would take a "one-size fits all" approach that would
"reflect the agricultural practices of regions producing the most volume of leafy
green vegetables to the detriment of regions producing less volume").
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trade-off management tools for a mechanism to facilitate that
analysis and to improve farmer decision making.1 8 0
III. ADAPTING TRADE-OFF MANAGEMENT TOOLS FOR COOPERATIVE
GOVERNANCE SCHEMES
Agriculture's trade-offs between food safety and environmental
protection are, in many ways, typical of regulation of all
industries.18 1 Auto manufacturers and other producers face similar
trade-offs between product safety and environmental footprints.
Resource management agencies such as the United States Forest
Service and the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement must balance resource extraction and economic growth
with environmental protection. 8 2 These other well-studied trade-
offs give rise to a wealth of literature exploring trade-off
management tools. This literature focuses on two primary
questions: First, how can a single agency achieve all of these
conflicting goals? And, second, how do multiple agencies regulating
a single industry interact? In search of a solution to the problems
outlined in Part II, this Part briefly synthesizes that literature,
categorizing tools based on when they are used: 1) pre-rulemaking,
2) rulemaking, and 3) post-rulemaking or implementation. This
analysis focuses on seven potential actors: Congress, regulated
entities, the primary regulating agency, a second agency, a
centralized executive actor (such as OIRA), federal courts, and the
general public.
By organizing the tools along a regulatory timeline, this Part
demonstrates that the adoption of cooperative governance generates
the need for a different kind of tool-one that focuses on a third
180. Another approach would be to take these decisions out of the hands of
farmers altogether by developing a comprehensive permitting scheme that
requires a farm-by-farm identification of appropriate processes to address both
food safety and environmental concerns. Such an approach would achieve the
desired flexibility and farm-specific tailoring without relying on farmers to
make public interest-minded decisions. It would also be extremely expensive to
implement and require congressional action (at least with respect to
environmental impacts, the FDA arguably has authority to implement such a
requirement with regard to food safety already).
181. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Trade-Offs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
1533, 1535-36 (1996) (noting that the general problem of health-health trade-
offs is ubiquitous).
182. About OSMRE-Who We Are, OFF. SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION &
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.osmre.gov/about.shtm (last modified Oct. 28, 2014)
(explaining that the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement is a
bureau in the Department of the Interior responsible for "balancing the nation's
need for continued domestic coal production with protection of the
environment"); About the Agency, U.S. FOREST SERVICE, http://www.fs.fed.us
/about-agency (last visited Feb. 13, 2015) (stating that the U.S. Forest Service's
mission is "to sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of the nation's
forests and grasslands to meet the needs of present and future generations").
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question: How can agencies provide adequate oversight where trade-
off assessment has been delegated to regulated entities? At each
point in time, a variety of actors are involved in trade-off analysis.
This Part concludes by proposing a new tool that builds a
prioritization process into implementation and enforcement of the
Food Safety Act's cooperative governance elements. Drawing on a
variety of the systematic rulemaking tools but shifting them to the
implementation phase, the proposal seeks to minimize the Food
Safety Act's environmental consequences.
A. Pre-Rulemaking
Prior to any rulemaking, Congress and, to a lesser extent, the
Executive, assign rulemaking authority. This initial decision has a
profound effect on how the rest of the process unfolds. The tools
necessary for managing trade-offs down the line will depend in large
part on this initial allocation. For instance, if Congress delegates
authority over an industry to multiple agencies, the risk of
conflicting regulatory directives-regulatory incoherence-may be
high and might justify authorizing joint rulemaking. Or, if Congress
delegates broad authority to a single agency, consultation and
strong executive oversight may be necessary to combat agency
tunnel vision.
Congress both engages in trade-off management itself and
delegates that management to agencies. In the former category, it
uses savings clauses to ensure that new enactments do not
supersede earlier statutes.1 8 3  Alternatively, it may expressly
prioritize one statutory scheme over another, determining which
will trump if conflict occurs. Although Congress does a lot of this
prioritization, it is, as many commentators have noted, poorly
situated to manage all trade-offs because "[e]very newly introduced
bill that delegates some authority to an agency brings with it the
risk of duplicating an earlier delegation to a different agency." 184
183. See, e.g., Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV.
181, 191 (2011) (noting that Congress often relies on broad savings clauses to
avoid the need to make more precise determinations about how statutes will
interact with one another). The alternative would be for Congress to leave it to
agencies and courts to determine whether a new statutory directive supersedes
an earlier one.
184. Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and
Statutory Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 297 (2011) (pointing out that
discontinuities may arise because "Congress may not have been paying
attention to a particular problem, especially if it was acting in a hurry");
Marisam, supra note 183, at 190 (rejecting the theory that Congress
intentionally uses duplicative delegations to spur agency competition, noting
that although this may be true some of the time, it does not explain the
majority of duplicative delegations). But see Keith Bradley, The Design of
Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745, 748 (2011) ("[A]gency interactions
are often an intentional, designed aspect of the structure of American
government.").
2015] 443
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
And such duplication of regulatory authority "create[s] a possibility
of regulatory dysfunction, with uncoordinated agencies working at
cross-purposes."185
Accordingly, although Congress's own efforts at trade-off
management are significant, its delegation of that management to
other actors is a far more important force. 186 Congress determines
who will be responsible for minimizing duplication and incoherence
among regulatory functions and directives. It can, for instance,
delegate responsibility for an entire regulatory program to a single
agency, or divide up responsibilities among several agencies. And it
often prescribes the use of other trade-off management tools. For
instance, it may set up a formal consultation relationship between
two agencies. 187 Or, it may expressly direct an agency to ensure
that complying with a new regulatory scheme will not make it
impossible for a regulatory entity to comply with an old one. The
Food Safety Act, for example, directs the FDA to ensure that the
Proposed Produce Safety Rule does "not include any requirements
that conflict with or duplicate the requirements of the national
organic program."'188
Perhaps Congress's most significant contribution in this arena
is its enactment of generic trade-off management tools such as the
Administrative Procedure Act,1 8 9  NEPA,19o the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 191 and the Paperwork Reduction Act.192 Among
185. See Aagaard, supra note 184, at 298 (arguing that although dysfunction
is always a possible outcome, it is not the inevitable result of overlap).
186. Congress also exercises back-end oversight and after-the-fact trade-off
management through the use of committee oversight, control of agency budgets,
and legislative amendments. Bradley, supra note 183, at 747. Although these
are each important tools, none are relevant to the discussion here because they
serve to correct mistakes in regulatory design and administration. Program
design should not rely on these post hoc tools except to the extent designers,
including Congress, can proceed despite uncertainty about the effectiveness of
program design, knowing that these tools exist to correct mistakes in the future.
187. For further discussion of consultation, see infra Subpart III.B.3.
188. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353,
§ 419(a)(3)(E), 124 Stat. 3885, 3900 (2011) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 350h(a)(3)(E)).
189. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2012)) (explaining the Act was designed "[t]o
improve the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative
procedure").
190. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat.
852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2012)) (identifying
one of its purposes as declaring "a national policy which will encourage
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment").
191. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2012)) (seeking "to improve
Federal rulemaking by creating procedures to analyze the availability of more
flexible regulatory approaches for small entities").
192. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812
(codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2012)) (explaining the Act is
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other things, these statutes require regulating agencies to assess the
effects of regulatory actions on competing goals. 193 They impose
systematic requirements that agencies engage in at least some
trade-off management during rulemaking, and they require agencies
to invite the public into that process.
B. Rulemaking
Rulemaking is the primary focus of administrative trade-off
analysis. Critical tools include notice and comment rulemaking,
cost-benefit analysis, environmental impact analysis, and
interagency consultation. These tools emphasize analyzing the facts
on the ground at a particular point in time and typically do not
provide an opportunity for future reevaluation. 194 The following
discussion focuses on four sets of essential players during the
rulemaking process: the primary regulatory agency, the general
public, secondary agencies, and the executive.
1. Primary Regulatory Agency
As many scholars have pointed out, regulatory trade-offs are
often ignored because agencies "suffer from both limited information
and (even more importantly) selective attention."195 Exhibiting what
Richard Stewart calls agency "tunnel vision," regulatory agencies
have difficulty addressing the full range of costs of their actions. 196
Agencies "tend to be driven by their organizational missions and the
interests of their organized client constituencies." 197 This problem is
so significant that the agency, or subagency, home for specific
programs often becomes a source of political contention. For
instance, during a 1994 fight over how to modernize and reorganize
the USDA, environmental and industry groups faced off over
whether the Soil Conservation Service, which implemented some of
designed "[t]o reduce paperwork and enhance the economy and efficiency of the
Government and the private sector by improving Federal information
policymaking').
193. See infra Subpart III.B.1 (describing how agencies assess the effects of
regulatory actions on competing goals).
194. It is important to note, however, that these rulemaking tools can be
used to support development of rules governing management of trade-offs that
arise during implementation. Subpart III.B.2 recommends this approach,
suggesting that the FDA use its rulemaking authority, and the information it
gathers through cost-benefit analysis and environmental impact assessment, to
develop a systematic post-rulemaking trade-off management tool.
195. Sunstein, supra note 181, at 1536.
196. Stewart, supra note 62, at 35-36 (introducing the phrase "tunnel
vision" to describe how agencies can become "insensitiv[e] to the broader range
of interests, values, and considerations at stake in their decisions").
197. Id. at 35; see also Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of
Risk Trade-off Analysis: Towards Parity in Environmental and Health-and-
Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1767 (2002) (discussing how
"[tiunnel vision" prevents agencies from considering ancillary effects).
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USDA's conservation programs, should be housed in the newly
formed Natural Resources Conservation Service, a department with
an environmental mission, or the newly formed Farm Services
Administration, the successor to an earlier service whose primary
mission was to protect farm revenue. 198 Industry interest groups
fought for the latter, afraid that the Natural Resources
Conservation Service would be hostile to farmers. 199 Environmental
groups fought for the former (and won), fearing that the Farm
Services Administration would not take conservation seriously. 200
Even agencies with express dual mandates struggle to
implement both. For instance, the Forest Service, which has
environmental and resource extraction mandates, was accused for
many years of failing to implement the former. 201
Notwithstanding their significant role in creating (or
exacerbating) conflict between various regulatory goals, agencies
can also do much of the work necessary to mitigate it. By
implementing a variety of congressional and executive mandates,
the primary regulatory agency is at the front line for gathering and
assessing information related to both direct and indirect trade-offs.
Three such mandates are of particular importance: the
Administrative Procedure Act, Executive Orders 12,866 and 13,563,
and NEPA.202
Applicable to almost all rulemaking, the Administrative
Procedure Act mandates a notice and comment process that opens
the door for public participation. 20 3 The commenting public can
dramatically expand the range of factors that an agency
considers.204
198. Alan R. Malasky & William E. Penn, USDA Reorganization-Fact or
Fiction?, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1161, 1167, 1171-72 (1995) (describing the
legislation authorizing the reorganization of the USDA and the politics
surrounding its enactment).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Biber, supra note 164, at 2-3 (recounting the Forest Service's struggle
to be a dual-missioned agency); see also Jason Waanders, Growing a Greener
Future? USDA and Natural Resource Conservation, 29 ENVTL. L. 235, 237
(1999) (suggesting that one hurdle for the Forest Service in implementing its
environmental mission was its placement within the USDA, which suggested
that national forests were akin to crops to be grown and harvested). The Office
of Surface Mining has the same problem.
202. See also Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-
1571 (2012); Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2012); Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C §§ 3501-3520 (2012) (requiring agencies to
assess particular effects of rulemaking and consider strategies for mitigating
those affects, where necessary).
203. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
204. See infra Subpart III.B.2 (elaborating on the role of the public in
administrative rulemaking).
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Executive Orders 12,866 and 13,563 require agencies, where
permitted by statute, to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the
proposed rulemaking. 205 The orders require that agencies make
choices to maximize net benefits, taking the full scope of costs and
benefits into account. 206  Thus, to the extent that the costs of
discordance are identifiable and quantifiable, cost-benefit analysis
should ensure that, in promulgating significant rules, agencies
consider the full scope of the rules' effects, including risk-risk trade-
offs. The results of such an analysis depend, of course, on the scope
and methodology of the analysis.207
Further, Executive Orders 12,866 and 13,563 require that the
primary regulatory agency seek OIRA's approval before finalizing
rules, thus involving another agency with a nonsubject specific
mission. 208 Instead, OIRA's mission is to increase the efficiency of
federal rulemaking and ensure that rulemaking is necessary, is cost
effective, and promotes the president's priorities. 209
Finally, NEPA requires agencies to draft Environmental Impact
Statements (or environmental assessments, depending on the scope
of the potential environmental harm) evaluating how a proposed
rule will affect the environment. 210 As a procedural statute, the Act
requires only that the agency give adequate consideration to
205. See Exec. Order. No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,847 (Jan. 18, 2011); Exec.
Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
206. See Exec. Order. No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,847. (Jan. 18, 2011); Exec.
Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
207. See generally MICHAEL L. LIVERMORE & RICHARD L. REVESZ, RETAKING
RATIONALITY: How COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE
ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2011) (arguing for improved methodology). The
viability of cost-benefit analysis to improve agency decision making is, of course,
contested. See, e.g., John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1607-08 (2013) (expressing concerns that cost-
benefit analysis depends too heavily on the conversion of benefits into dollar
values and instead proposing a well-being analysis which relies upon
psychological data regarding quality of life).
208. See Exec. Order. No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,847 (Jan. 18, 2011); Exec.
Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
209. Memorandum from Leon E. Panetta, Dir. of the Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, to Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies, Guidance for Implementing E.O.
12,866 (Oct. 12, 1993), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files
/omb/assets/inforeg/eol2866_implementation-guidance.pdf. For further
discussion of OIRA's role, see infra Subpart III.B.4. The relationship between
agencies and OIRA is occasionally fraught, as some agencies resist its oversight.
See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, Responding to Agency
Avoidance of OIRA, 37 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 447, 448-49 (2014) (suggesting
that agencies may attempt to avoid OIRA oversight where they find it
burdensome); Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1760-61 (2013) (suggesting that agencies engage in
strategic self-insulation).
210. The statute also imposes its own public participation requirements, in
addition to those mandated by the APA.
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environmental effects and does not require that it mitigate them.211
Many critics argue that the Act is ineffective at protecting the
environment and results in the production of large, costly, and
uninformative documents. 212  But defenders claim that, at a
minimum, the statute forces agency decision makers to take
environmental interests into account and creates incentives to
reduce the most serious of a project's environmental harms in order
to avoid some of the Act's more burdensome requirements. 2 13
2. The General Public
The public, including individual citizens and interest groups,
are, in many ways, the police of administrative law. 214 Through
public comment processes, which allow the public to weigh in both
on rulemaking proceedings themselves and on rulemaking trade-off
analyses, the general public can identify potential collateral
consequences that the regulating agency may have missed. In doing
so, public commenters force the agency, at a minimum, to respond to
their concerns. This "crowdsourcing" of trade-off identification can
play a significant role in mitigating agency tunnel vision,
particularly since participating members of the public can use
citizen suits to enforce the agency's obligation to respond to
comments. 2 15
3. Secondary Agencies
Operating in what Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi called "shared
regulatory space," secondary agencies (by which I mean an agency
other than the one with primary regulatory authority) can help
manage trade-offs through a variety of formal and informal
211. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012) (imposing the requirement that federal
agencies "include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement... on... the environmental impact of the
proposed action," but imposing no mitigation requirement).
212. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 150, at 905 (summarizing the
critiques of NEPA).
213. Id. at 906-08 (criticizing the statute for its erroneous assumption that
it is possible to put together an ex ante comprehensive and accurate assessment
of a project's environmental impacts and calling instead to revisit the impact
assessment through ongoing monitoring and project reassessment).
214. See Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2015) (manuscript at 20), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2444396 (identifying "civil society" as an important
check on the power of agency leadership).
215. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012)
(guaranteeing a right of review of any agency action for any aggrieved party);
see Michaels, supra note 214 (manuscript at 21 & n.125 (citing several cases to
support the proposition that failure to respond to comments is an actionable
offense).
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coordination mechanisms. 216  These mechanisms include joint
rulemaking, consultation, and cooperative agreements. Joint
rulemaking, which is fairly rare, allows two agencies to develop a set
of regulations together. 217 For instance, in 2009 the EPA and the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration undertook joint
rulemaking to establish emission standards (over which the EPA
had authority) and fuel efficiency standards (over which the
Highway Administration had authority).218  Independent rules
might have employed different standard-setting methodologies and
compliance requirements that would have made compliance with
both quite onerous and complicated. 219
216. See generally Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in
Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012). In their work,
Freeman and Rossi describe each of these mechanisms and assess their
effectiveness relative to a variety of measures including efficiency and
accountability. Id.; see also Bradley, supra note 183 ("[A]n administrative
agency's most important checks are often other agencies."). This view of shared
regulatory space in a complex and overlapping bureaucracy rejects older views
of the unitary executive, and it embraces the notion that the existence of shared
regulatory space may improve agency decision making. See, e.g., Eric Biber,
The More the Merrier: Multiple Agencies and the Future of Administrative Law
Scholarship, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 78, 78 (2012) (identifying a trend in newer
administrative law scholarship to focus on "how multiple agencies interact,"
rather than on the behavior of individual agencies); Jacob E. Gersen,
Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP.
CT. REV. 201, 203; see also Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Architecture of Smart
Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2006) (identifying lost safeguards and lost benefits of
agency competition as a cost of agency unification). Relatedly, this view also
embraces overlap in agency jurisdiction as a mechanism for what Neal Kumar
Katyal calls a "second-best" checks and balances. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal
Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within,
115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316 (2006) (arguing that separation and overlap of various
executive foreign policy functions can serve as an internal check on presidential
power). This scholarship moves beyond the premise that "[a]dministrative law
is built primarily around the solo strategy, in which each agency operates as an
autonomous unit and is accountable as an autonomous unit to its respective
legislature, public, and courts." Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 29, at 113.
217. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 216, at 1166 (describing joint rulemaking
as "an interagency regulatory negotiation").
218. See Biber, supra note 216, at 80 (observing that this type of joint
rulemaking is an example of "collaboration among agencies-in other words,
agencies working together to achieve a common goal"). This type of
collaborative approach may reduce compliance costs for regulated entities and
reduce some direct trade-offs, but it is unlikely to be employed frequently to
reduce indirect trade-offs.
219. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 216, at 1169-70 (describing the
benefits of the EPA-Highway Administration joint rulemaking). Agencies
might also coordinate to ensure that two sets of rules are coherent with one
another. For instance, in the mid-1990s, the EPA and the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration coordinated regarding regulations requiring firms to
develop toxic chemical safety plans; as a result, firms were able to develop a
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Short of joint rulemaking, consultation provides agencies with
opportunities to weigh in on the activities of other agencies,
ensuring that certain goals are prioritized or at least adequately
considered. 220  Some statutes make consultation mandatory. For
instance, the Endangered Species Act requires that an action-taking
agency consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service if the agency
determines that the planned action "will likely affect" an
endangered species. 221 The Service is then tasked with determining
whether the action will "jeopardize the continued existence" of the
species or destroy or adversely modify its critical habitat.222
Consultation can also occur even earlier in the regulatory process,
before an agency has settled on an action to take. For instance, the
National Institute of Occupational Health and Safety, within the
Department of Health and Human Services, advises the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, a section of the
Department of Labor; the latter agency develops its rulemaking
priorities based in part on the direction from the former agency. 223
Consultation, whether it provides the second agency with a veto
power or merely allows it to provide advice, provides the second
agency an opportunity to "attempt to change another agency's
position as that second agency pursues a different, somewhat
conflicting goal."224
Finally, agencies regularly enter into various forms of
cooperative agreements aimed at delineating jurisdiction;
establishing procedures for information sharing, coordinating
review, approval, and enforcement processes; and agreeing to
single management plan that was compliant with both agencies' regulations.
Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 4, at 699.
220. Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 51 (2010) (identifying consultation as
one tool available to monitor independent agencies because consultation
provides an opportunity for the consulting agency to "sound fire alarms to
interested groups early in the ... regulatory decision-making process").
221. Considering how interagency interactions can help a single agency
achieve multiple goals, Eric Biber refers to this type of consultation as an
example of "agency as regulator" where the second agency has veto power over
the primary agency's action. See Biber, supra note 164, at 45-58 (also putting
OIRA into this category).
222. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), (3); Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species
Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce,
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 316 (1993) (observing that the strength of the
requirement is that it is "unambiguous and absolute").
223. Bradley, supra note 184, at 753-54.
224. Biber, supra note 216, at 80 (citing J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman,
Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLuM. L. REV. 2217, 2221 (2005) ("[A]gencies
can be prompted to take their secondary missions more seriously when
Congress enhances interagency lobbying by increasing the power of other
agencies, which derive relevant expertise and interests from their own statutory
mandates, to lobby the implementing agency.")).
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collaborate. 225  Such agreements allow agencies to divide up
workload in areas of overlapping responsibility, and thus reduce the
duplication of administrative effort.226 They also allow agencies
working together to harmonize regulatory activity.
Agency coordination, whether mandated or agency initiated, can
be difficult and costly to achieve. But it can also be an effective tool
for combatting the costs of overlapping agency jurisdiction (which
often results in direct trade-offs) and agency tunnel vision (which
can cause both direct and indirect trade-offs).
Although not squarely within the category of secondary
agencies, numerous regulatory regimes employ multi-agency efforts
to ensure that various interests are protected in the implementation
of a single regulatory program. Perhaps the most famous example
of this is the "God Squad," which has the power to lift certain
Endangered Species Act protections where it would be in the
national interest to do so. 227  The God Squad, formally the
Endangered Species Committee, is made up of the Secretary of
Agriculture, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Council
of Economic Advisors, the EPA Administrator, the Secretary of the
Interior, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, and a seventh member, who is
appointed by the president on a case-by-case basis to represent the
affected state.228 Each member of the committee represents the
various interests of his or her home agency or state in reaching a
decision on individual petitions for exemption.
iv. Executive Oversight
Like Congress, the White House also plays a dual role of
managing trade-offs itself and directing others to do so through the
delegation of authority and mandated use of management tools.
Perhaps the most important of these tools is centralized rulemaking
review. Using executive orders, every president since Reagan has
centralized oversight of agency rulemaking through OIRA.229
225. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 216, at 1161-65 (providing examples of
these cooperative agreements).
226. See Marisam, supra note 183, at 212 (characterizing this type of effort
as "agency abdication" of authority).
227. Jan Hasselman, Holes in the Endangered Species Act Safety Net: The
Role of Agency 'Discretion" in Section 7 Consultation, 25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125,
131 (2006).
228. See generally Jared des Rosiers, Note, The Exemption Process Under the
Endangered Species Act: How the "God Squad" Works and Why, 66 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 825, 853-54 (1991) (laying out the God Squad process).
229. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review,
Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1339 (2013); see also
Marisam, supra note 183, at 204-05 (describing OIRA as an "antiduplication
institution[] that operate[s] without direct presidential communication with
[the] agency head[]"). Like the relationship between OIRA and agencies, the
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Michael Livermore and Richard Revesz argue that this centralized
review is an important tool for combatting agency capture by
organized interest groups. 230  Because OIRA is a generalist
institution, it is less subject to capture itself.231 Here, I extend this
logic to include not just capture by specific organized interests, but
agency tunnel vision, i.e., capture by particular goals.232 OIRA can
force agencies to incorporate other regulatory goals into rulemaking
processes by refusing to approve a cost-benefit analysis that fails to
consider a regulation's collateral consequences.
The White House also manages trade-offs through various other
ad hoc mechanisms. One such important mechanism is the creation
of cross-agency regulatory initiatives. The White House will often
designate a "czar" to guide these processes. 233 The czar can then
convey White House priorities and facilitate informal agency
communication.
C. Post-Rulemaking and Implementation
Once a rule is finalized, there are a variety of opportunities for
managing unanticipated trade-offs (whether they were
unanticipated because they were unforeseeable or because of some
breakdown in the planning process). None of these tools provide a
systematic mechanism for identifying and evaluating trade-offs, and
they are invoked only when a particular actor is dissatisfied with
the regulatory outcome. Two actors are particularly important in
the post-rulemaking realm: federal courts and regulated entities.
Federal courts frequently resolve disputes among competing
regulatory directives and direct agencies to take other factors into
consideration during rulemaking processes. 234 Although courts play
relationship between the President and OIRA is not uncomplicated. As
Jennifer Nou points out, the "President[ delegate[s] regulatory review to a
number of agents... who themselves disagree and conflict over what the
President desires." See Nou, supra note 209, at 1761; see also Cass R. Sunstein,
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126
HARv. L. REV. 1838, 1840-43 (2013) (arguing that numerous individuals, offices
(including the White House), and other agencies drive OIRA decision making).
230. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 229, at 1340-41 (criticizing the two
traditional justifications for centralized review: "increasing presidential power
over the administrative state and checking agency overzealousness" which
manifests as over-regulation).
231. See id. at 1341 (proposing reforms to further reduce OIRA's capture
potential, and arguing that OIRA can reduce the influence of any one interest
group in a rulemaking process because it solicits input from multiple agencies,
seeking a variety of institutional perspectives and interests).
232. Tunnel vision could follow from, or be made worse by, well-organized
special interests, but it could also arise independently.
233. Marisam, supra note 183, at 207-08.
234. For an example of judicial resolution of a direct conflict between
competing regulatory schemes, see Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma v.
National Indian Gaming Commission, 327 F.3d 1019, 1022-24 (10th Cir. 2003)
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a significant role in resolving trade-offs, their role is less essential
when considering, ex ante, how to design a trade-off management
scheme. 235 There may, however, be some circumstances where it is
desirable to forego planned trade-off management and rely only on
the courts. For instance, where there is a low probability that a
direct trade-off will actually arise, it may be more efficient to see if a
trade-off actually occurs before doing anything about it.236
Although regulated entities are not typically included in
analysis of trade-off management, they play a critical role. Here, it
is the absence of a particular trade-off management tool that is
significant. The more flexibility regulated entities have, the more
substantial their role in trade-off management. Where flexibility is
limited, regulated entities, who often are the first to discover
regulatory incoherence, must seek resolution through advocacy
before the agencies, the courts, or both.
In many circumstances, however, where regulated entities have
more flexibility, they avoid potential direct trade-offs themselves
through their approaches to regulatory compliance. This might
occur where separate agencies regulating the same industrial
practice each set performance standards. "[P]erformance-based
regulation[s] seta performance goals and allow individuals and
firms to decide how to meet them.' '237 Armed with this flexibility,
firms can design compliance strategies that reconcile various
regulatory obligations, preventing regulatory schemes from
becoming mutually exclusive.
It may also occur where, as in the agriculture context, the
regulating agencies rely heavily on cooperative governance.
Cooperative governance schemes like HACCP and organics
(resolving a conflict between a statute authorizing use of a particular gaming
device and another statute prohibiting use of that device). For an example of a
judicial directive to any agency to consider additional goals in a regulatory
process, see Competitive Enterprise Institute v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 956 F.2d 321, 323-24 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that the
Highway Administration was obliged to consider the argument that higher fuel-
efficiency standards would force auto manufacturers to produce less-safe cars).
235. See supra note 186 (making the same argument regarding Congress's
numerous backend oversight tools). To some small degree, the potential for
judicial action creates an incentive for agencies to comply with their existing
trade-off management obligations, but this is hardly an independent trade-off
management tool.
236. The efficiency may arise at least in part from the fact that in some
circumstances the regulated entity is in the best position to determine if a
trade-off exists. In such a circumstance, the regulated entity identifies the
trade-off in the first instance and returns to the agency or goes to court to seek
resolution. See supra Subpart III.B.1 (discussing the role of regulated entities
in more detail).
237. Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and
Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV.
705, 706 (2003).
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regulation, both of which ask regulated entities to develop facility
management plans, invite regulated entities into the regulatory
process, giving them significant flexibility and authority over onsite
regulatory implementation. 238  By exercising this authority,
regulated entities themselves prioritize among various regulatory
goals.239
This category also includes congressional oversight via
hearings, appropriations, and statutory amendment. Agencies can
also engage in post hoc trade-off management through enforcement
decisions, guidance documents, and revised rulemaking.
D. Designing a New Trade-Off Management Scheme for
Agriculture
This timeline reveals that no existing trade-off management
tool provides a systematic approach to post-rulemaking assessment.
The primary post-rulemaking tools are ad hoc, and no tool creates
accountability for regulated entities' trade-off decisions. But, as
Part II demonstrated, agricultural regulation, which employs
cooperative governance, leaves the resolution of many of the precise
details of regulation to be decided by regulated entities after
rulemaking is complete. The common use of voluntary standards,
the reliance on cooperative governance, and the wide variation in
farm conditions all point toward the adoption of a trade-off
management tool that can be employed systematically during post-
rulemaking implementation of the Food Safety Act. 240
Although literature on cooperative governance has focused on
the general question of how to improve firm decision making with
regard to the cooperative scheme's primary regulatory goal-rather
than on the more specific question of how to constrain regulated
entities' trade-offs among competing regulatory goals-that
238. See Stewart, supra note 62 (suggesting that this regulatory strategy
may be appropriate where "the conduct of organizations [is] too far ranging and
dynamic... to be successfully contained by external controls" and that the
strategy may be useful to overcome "inherent limits on government
information"); supra notes 61, 63 and accompanying text (describing HACCP);
supra note 87 (describing the federal organics program).
239. Of course, agencies-through inspectors, auditors, and other
enforcers-are involved in this process.
240. Another approach to resolving this problem would be to change the
underlying incentives that farmers are responding to. For instance, if
supermarkets only accepted environmentally friendly produce, farmers would
have a strong financial incentive to take environmental concerns more
seriously. The same would be true if they faced more aggressive and mandatory
environmental regulation. Although such mechanisms will ultimately be
necessary to address agriculture's underlying environmental harms, the
discussion here focuses on mitigating the additional environmental harm
caused by the implementation of the Food Safety Act in particular and is thus
limited to mechanisms that could be developed within the framework of that
statute.
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literature can nevertheless offer some useful insights in designing a
new tool. The following proposal draws both on that literature and
on the rulemaking trade-off management tools described above to
design a program to create accountability for regulated entities. The
primary goal of this program is to ensure that the Food Safety Act's
collateral environmental consequences are justified.
Relying entirely on its Food Safety Act rulemaking authority,
the FDA could mandate that farmers comply with the Act's
environmental directive, requiring them to engage in express
balancing of food safety and environmental goals. It could also
enlist the help of the USDA to aid in oversight of that balancing.
To do this, the FDA could incorporate the Food Safety Act's
environmental mandate into the reflexive portions of the
regulations; that is, the portions that provide flexibility and
mandate recordkeeping to support that flexibility. Specifically, the
FDA could direct farmers to identify the primary environmental
impacts of their food safety choices and select alternatives where the
effects are severe.
These assessments, which combine elements of an agency's
environmental impact statement and cost-benefit analysis
obligations, would include a written conclusion regarding (1) how
steps to protect food safety would affect environmental outcomes
(and their participation in environmental programs), and (2)
whether the effect is acceptable given the level of food safety risk.
This innovation would obligate farmers to make express (and thus
reviewable) decisions regarding potential trade-offs.
This writing requirement has several potential benefits. For
those farmers already inclined to make environmental goals a
priority, it could provide a mechanism by which to justify that choice
to inspectors and auditors. For these farmers, the written analysis
reduces the risk that, by prioritizing the environmental concern, the
farmer will lose market access. 241 This would be particularly true if
this innovation were accompanied by a statutory amendment
increasing the liability standard from strict liability to negligence
vis-a-vis food-safety-related harm resulting from specific actions
taken to protect environmental interests. 242
For farmers without such inclination, the writing obligation
may raise environmental consciousness. For many farmers for
whom environmental effects were not previously a factor in their
decision making, the writing exercise would force express
241. See Stuart, supra note 118, at 54 (describing the ethical challenge faced
by farmers who feel obligated to protect the environment but are afraid of losing
market access).
242. To qualify for the safe harbor, the farmer would need both the FDA and
USDA to sign off on the plan, establishing both that the environmental interest
was legitimate and that the food safety risk was acceptable. This safe harbor is
the only element of the proposal that would require statutory action.
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consideration of those effects and might thus improve the quality of
decision making even absent robust agency oversight. 243
A public disclosure requirement could reduce the risk that some
farmers will continue to downplay- environmental concerns. 244
Manipulating their information advantage over inspectors, many
farmers will likely draft assessments supporting their preferred
course of action without undertaking genuine balancing. Although
the writing requirement cannot entirely correct this problem, it can
mitigate the problem, particularly if assessments are made public. 245
Local residents and nonprofit organizations may have better
information about the local environment than do inspectors and
could play an important enforcement role.246  The threat of
reputational harm could also improve decision-making quality for
some farmers.
These evaluations would further serve as an information
gathering tool. By creating a public body of information about
environmental conditions on individual farms, the evaluations could
serve as a useful tool for developing future environmental regulatory
programs. Both state and federal regulators could draw on this
bank of information to establish location-appropriate regulatory
standards and to ramp up enforcement of existing environmental
programs that could be, but generally are not, applied to farms. 247
243. Kenneth Bamberger describes this type of requirement as "attention
regulation." Bamberger, supra note 156, at 447-48. By getting individuals to
devote attention to and feel responsibility for a particular decision, a regulation
can improve decision-making outcomes even without comprehensive oversight.
See id. (identifying examples from financial regulation).
244. Id. at 450 ("[T]he very process of reporting promotes the type of
cognitive accountability that results from reviewability.").
245. On the importance of public disclosure, see Orts, supra note 112, at
1323 (identifying "[p]ublic disclosure [as] the backbone" of successful reflexive
law); cf. Freeman, supra note 156, at 30 (arguing that public interest groups
and nonprofit organizations can play a critical role in oversight and
enforcement). A more extreme version of this requirement would be to mandate
notice and comment on each assessment, but given the large number of
regulated entities-2.1 million as of 2012-the resulting regulatory burden
would be crippling. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AC-12-A-51, 2012 CENSUS OF
AGRICULTURE: UNITED STATES SUMMARY AND STATE DATA (2014).
246. Making written assessments public gives the local community an
opportunity to weigh in on the farming choices that have community-wide
impacts. This recommendation parallels provisions in other environmental
programs that give community members an active role in enforcement. For
instance, under the Clean Water Act, pollution discharge permits and firm
monitoring are made public so that citizens may sue to enforce permit
violations. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1318-1319 (2012). Relying on the community to
engage in policing does, however, raise important questions about the equal
existence of such groups from one rural community to another.
247. For instance, state governments have substantial leeway to apply
various aspects of the Clean Air Act to farms, but generally choose not to do so.
See generally Clemmer, supra note 22 (describing potential avenues for using
the Clean Air Act to address air pollution from farms).
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For many farmers, fulfilling this obligation may test the bounds
of their expertise. The larger of these farmers will likely turn to
consultants, as they will for food safety compliance more generally.
But the FDA should also seek to mitigate this concern by providing
comprehensive guidance. 248 In conjunction with the USDA and with
local extension services, the FDA should assist farmers with the
technical challenges involved in completing these evaluations. 249
Another concern for many farmers would be compliance costs.
Before implementing this proposal, the FDA should identify its
marginal cost, beyond that already imposed by the Food Safety Act's
extensive recordkeeping and safety planning requirements. This
marginal cost would likely be minimal. Further, smaller operations
are already exempt from many of the Act's more onerous
requirements. 250 These operations should be exempt from this
proposal as well. But the cap for the carve-out is fairly low-
$500,000 annual revenue. 251 To determine whether to exempt an
even larger pool of farms, the FDA should conduct an empirical
analysis estimating compliance costs and assessing potential impact
on profit margins and economic viability.252
The FDA should also establish guidelines for private auditors
and inspectors to review these written determinations. Here,
248. Technical guidance will be critical, particularly for small. and medium-
sized farms that could not afford to hire a consultant to conduct the evaluation.
It can also constitute what Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel call
"benchmarking," or "provid[ing] effective measures of performance... [that]
take account of local diversity and resulting differences in the direction of local
innovation." See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 345-46, 348 (1998)
("Benchmarking does not produce laboratory protocols by which successful
experiments can be reproduced elsewhere. Rather, it reveals or leads to the
discovery of unsuspected goals and indicates the guiding principles and related
kinds of means for obtaining them.").
249. The extension services are operations of the land grant colleges.
Extension, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., http://nifa.usda.gov/extension (last visited Apr.
2, 2015). The program provides educational services in rural areas and is often
an important resource of technical information (related to both agricultural
methods and USDA programs) for farmers. See id.
250. Under the Food Safety Act's Tester-Hagan Amendment, farms grossing
under $500,000 annually and selling over fifty percent of their produce direct to
restaurants and consumers are exempt from many of the Act's requirements.
FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, 21 U.S.C. § 350h(f) (2012); Peter
Anderson, Comment, Empowering Local and Sustainable Food: Does the Food
Safety Modernization Act's Tester-Hagan Amendment Remove Enough
Barriers?, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 145, 147 (2012).
251. 21 U.S.C. § 350h(f)(1) (2012).
252. Although smaller operations are equally likely to have poor
environmental practices, the scope of those harms will almost certainly be
smaller. For many of these small farmers, the social costs of going out of
business (which include costs related to local food access, employment, etc.)
would likely outweigh the benefits of compliance with this proposal.
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collaboration with the USDA would be beneficial. 253 The USDA has
both expertise on farming practices and considerable experience
working directly with farmers. In particular, the USDA's Natural
Resources Conservation Service, which oversees the green payment
programs, would be an ideal partner.254 In addition to providing
expertise, collaboration with the Natural Resources Conservation
Service has the added benefit of introducing an environmental
mission to counterbalance the FDA's food safety mission.255
Working with FDA officials, the Natural Resources Conservation
Service would be well positioned to advocate for environmental
goals. 256
Success of this program would require the FDA to regulate the
behavior of private third-party auditors. Historically, these auditors
have had substantial influence over farmer behavior by controlling
farmers' access to markets. 257 These auditors have no formal role in
the Food Safety Act regulatory scheme, but it is likely that retailers
will continue to require their stamp of approval, particularly as the
FDA intends "inspection ... to be only a relatively minor part of [its]
overall compliance effort."2 58  Accordingly, the FDA should
promulgate rules requiring these auditors to follow the same
standards as public inspectors in balancing food safety and
environmental protections. To receive certification to practice,
auditors should be required to receive training in how to implement
these standards. 259
These innovations preserve the benefits of cooperative
governance, taking advantage of farmers' location-specific expertise
253. The statute allows the FDA to collaborate with the USDA and state-
level agriculture agencies on enforcement.
254. Financial Assistance, USDA NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE,
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/financial/
(last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
255. See supra Subpart III.B.3 (describing the advantages of having agencies
with competing goals collaborate).
256. Collaboration with the EPA may better serve this end, but there is no
existing statutory mechanism authorizing it.
257. See supra Subpart I.B.2 (describing the role of third-party auditors in
implementing the California Leafy Green Marketing Agreement).
258. Proposed Produce Safety Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 3504, 3619 (proposed Jan.
16, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 16, 112). As the FDA explained, "With
a community as large and diverse as the produce farming industry, it is not
reasonable to expect that industry-wide compliance can be gained primarily
through inspection and enforcement ...... Id. at 3609. The statute does
provide a formal role for third-party auditors in certifying foreign suppliers, and
the FDA is in the process of drafting rules to govern auditor standards. In the
introduction to the Proposed Produce Safety Rule, the FDA acknowledges that
it expects third-party auditors to continue to play an important role for
domestic producers. Id. at 3531, 3610.
259. Eric Orts suggests that auditor accreditation "should lead ordinarily to
presumptions against ... legal liability ... except in cases of gross negligence,
recklessness, or fraud." Orts, supra note 112, at 1322-23.
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and providing them flexibility. At the same time, they add oversight
to farmers' decisions regarding prioritization between food safety
and environmental goals, a set of decisions that, under the current
scheme, is not policed.
This proposal also preserves a role for ex ante environmental
impact and cost-benefit analysis. These tools will provide the FDA
with the background information that it needs to develop guidance
for farmers and oversight criteria to be used by inspectors and third-
party auditors.
CONCLUSION
The reforms proposed in this Article aim to evaluate potential
trade-offs between the new food safety regime and environmental
protection goals and programs. They do not address the shortfalls of
existing environmental programs. Environmental regulation of
agriculture is the next frontier for the environmental movement.
Environmental advocates have targeted farming as it relates to
water use, water quality, energy use, biodiversity, and toxics. In
recent years, many of the national environmental organizations that
have played critical roles in other areas have turned their attention
to the farm.260 Although comprehensive regulation in this area is
far from inevitable, it is likely that these groups will continue to
make inroads. 261
Scholars and advocates have proposed a wide variety of new
regulatory schemes designed to respond to the particular
environmental costs of agriculture. For instance, focusing on
transparency problems, some have proposed eco-labeling schemes.262
260. For instance, the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense
Council have both developed agricultural initiatives. See Agriculture and Food,
SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/policy/agriculture (last visited Feb. 18,
2015); Safe, Sustainable Food, NRDC, http://www.nrdc.org/food/ (last visited
Feb. 18, 2015).
261. For example, California is taking steps to help farmers become more
water efficient, as severe drought threatens production. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION PLAN 29 (2014),
available at http://www.usda.gov/oce/climatechange/adaptation/USDAClimate
ChangeAdaptationPlanFULL.pdf. Similarly, the USDA recently
announced a major initiative to help farmers become more resilient to climate
change. Id. at 2. This example suggests that the environmental issues that are
likely to get the most immediate attention are those threatening agricultural
productivity. Id. at 9. The USDA's long time focus on soil erosion, a concern for
the federal government since the Dust Bowl era, is another example of this
phenomenon. 75 Years Helping People Help the Land: A Brief History of NRCS,
USDA NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps
/portal/nrcs/detaillnational/about/history/?cid=nrcsl43 021392 (last visited Feb.
18, 2015).
262. See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki, The Future of Food Eco-Labeling: A
Comparative Analysis, in FOOD, AGRICULTURE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra
note 6, at 301, 301-23 (exploring potential eco-labeling schemes designed to
2015] 459
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
Some have called for expanded green payment programs that would
allow farmers to adopt ecological improvements without forcing
them to internalize the costs of those actions. 263 Other proposals
include creative schemes to use nuisance law and toxic cleanup laws
to regulate CAFO manure.26 4
Each of these programs would likely improve the status quo
from an environmental perspective. It is possible, however, that
additional conflict may arise as environmental regulation is ramped
up. This trade-off could cut in the opposite direction, sacrificing food
safety concerns to achieve environmental goals. Or it could track
the types of trade-offs described in Part I, sacrificing environmental
goals to maximize food safety. The discussion here has implications
for program design for each of these proposals. So long as
cooperative governance and voluntariness remain hallmarks of
agricultural regulation, there will be a need to adopt trade-off
management tools to prevent the prioritization function from being
delegated entirely to regulated entities.
promote "sustainable food"); see also Stewart, supra note 62, at 97 (describing
eco-labeling schemes as "market-based information strategies.., to provide
consumers and investors with information regarding the environmental
performance of products and firms").
263. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Agriculture and Ecosystem Services: Paying
Farmers to Do the New Right Thing, in FOOD, AGRICULTURE, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 6, at 241, 260-61 (describing potential for
expanding green payment tools to promote "farm multifunctionality," an
approach that treats farms both as sources of provisions and as sources of
ecosystem services); Salzman, supra note 98, at 872 (arguing that it makes
sense to invest in natural capital and exploring various approaches to structure
ecosystem markets); see also Stewart, supra note 62, at 98 (describing this type
of program as a "[p]ure subsid[y] to polluters" and treating it as a partial but
not complete substitute for command-and-control regulation).
264. See Terence J. Centner, Nutrient Pollution from Land Applications of
Manure: Discerning a Remedy for Pollution, 21 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 213, 218-
20 (2010).
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